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As the U.S. military continuously aligns the appropriate platforms to conduct 
Maritime Irregular Warfare (MIW), Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has 
leased/chartered civilian ships to provide the appropriate vessels needed to support 
operations in Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P). The framework of this 
study showcases three specific vessels with their corresponding capabilities on cost per 
day basis.  Our findings and analyses may aid commanders in determining the most 
appropriate vessel and cost-effective acquisition method to accomplish specific MIW 
missions in not only OEF-P, but also in other MIW environments.  Based on the analysis 
and recommendations presented in this project, decision makers in this arena will have a 
mechanism from which to make a more informed decision regarding the acquisition of 
vessels supporting MIW.  Decision makers will be able to evaluate various potential 
MIW scenarios; identify specific vessel capabilities to meet their operational 
requirements; and acquire vessels more cost-effectively based on total daily rate costs.  
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As the U.S. military increasingly focuses more of its attention on irregular warfare 
(IW), each of the Services is struggling with how they can best leverage their resources 
and capabilities to address current and emerging asymmetric threats.  An increasingly 
stressed budget requires the Navy and the other Services to think about acquisition in 
more untraditional ways than ever before.  Unfortunately, big and expensive platforms 
tend to be the commonly chosen solution to prosecute contemporary and future conflicts. 
This fixation on relatively few large and costly platforms, or units that are organized to 
wage big wars, has proven difficult to adapt to effectively confront smaller asymmetric 
and irregular threats.   
As the United States military continuously aligns the appropriate platforms to 
conduct MIW, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has leased/chartered 
civilian ships to provide the appropriate vessels needed to support operations in 
Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–P).  Different vessels have been utilized 
for this mission to meet the shifting requirements of not only the combatant commanders 
but also those of the Philippine Government.  
The primary questions addressed in this study are as follows: 
• Are leased/chartered ships meeting the requirements to best support MIW? 
• What is the most appropriate mechanism for acquiring vessels to support 
MIW?  
Using the experience gained in the Philippines during OEF–P as a base-line 
model, we explored the capabilities of potential vessels relative to the requirements in 
potential MIW environments, and we investigated those acquisition methods most 
appropriate for obtaining vessels.  This study recommends the most effective vessels, in 
terms of cost and performance, to accomplish specific MIW missions and identifies the 
most effective acquisition method to meet those needs.  Although we focus on the 
Philippines as a base-line case, we ultimately lay out three potential vessels for MIW and  
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state how they would or would not be effective in a range of scenarios—one of which we 
have exercised through a wargame and for which we have observable data due to ongoing 
operations. 
Although MIW is not currently defined in Naval or Joint doctrine, in simple terms 
it is the maritime component of IW conducted from or on a body of water. Figure E-1 










Figure E-1.   Maritime Irregular Warfare Activities  
Figure E-2 identifies operations, tactics, and activities comprising MIW from the 
friendly, or U.S., side and the enemy’s side.  These operations and tactics have been long 
utilized by both the U.S. and its adversaries and are likely to continue to be used in the 
foreseeable future.  Since there is not a ready definition of MIW, the activities listed 
below quickly identify activities that should likely be included in a broad definition of 
MIW and establish a framework of MIW for our continuing research on vessels utilized 







Friendly Operations, Tactics & 
Activities Comprising MIW 
Enemy Operations, Tactics & Activities 
Comprising MIW 
Show of Force: providing conspicuous 
naval forces to deter aggression  
Hit-and-run attacks by small boats  
Maritime Interdiction Ops (MIO) & Visit, 
Board, Search and Seizure Ops (VBSS)  
Maritime suicide attacks using light 
fiberglass boats  
Maritime mobility in support of Special 
Operations and agencies  
Frogmen to sink opponent’s vessels  
Sea-based forces afloat in support of 
operations ashore  
Smuggling of equipment/drugs on various 
vessels  
Maritime raids; hit-and-run attacks by 
small boats; frogman ship attacks  
Piracy and hijacking of vessels  
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
(ISR) of areas of interest ashore  
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance  
Training, advising and assisting partner 
nations’ maritime forces (proxies)   
Invasion of territory via maritime routes  
Civil affairs and construction activities to 
develop maritime infrastructure  
Financial payments or civil support to local 
populace 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
from a sea base or at sea  
Humanitarian assistance at sea 
Figure E-2.   Friendly and Enemy Components of Operations, Tactics & Activities 
Comprising Maritime Irregular Warfare (From: DeLuca & Hoffmann, 
2010) 
The case of OEF–P is a contemporary example of MIW and since the majority of 
the insurgency takes place in the Sulu Archipelago region of the Philippines, these 
operations require a significant maritime component to constantly adapt to the evolving 
operational environment.  As a result, three different types of martitime support vessels 
have been previously or currently assigned to Task Force Archipelago to support the 
Philippine Naval Marines and SEALs in conducting their operations. 
Specifically in OEF–P, maritime forces are used to support and sustain distributed 
U.S. outposts that are seeking to secure the local population and conduct civil military 
operations.  These operations include logisitcs and intelligence support, as well as an 
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afloat forward-staging base or operating base.  They also include providing maritime 
quick reaction-force deployment and support training of AFP soldiers and security forces.  
A vessel that supports maritime forces operating in this irregular environment needs to be 
able to act as a forward staging base, provide maritime mobility, refuel and rearm small 
crafts, such as the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 11-meter Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB) and the MKV Special Operations Craft (SOC), and provide a platform for 
maritime-security and humanitarian-assistance planning and operations.  The 
overarching task of U.S. maritime forces has been to build capacity amongst the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Naval Marines and SEALs through training, equipping 
and operational support.  With this task in mind, the U.S. has utilized various maritime-
support vessels throughout OEF–P, relying on lease/charter agreements and vessels of 
opportunity to provide direct logistics and employment support to SOF operations 
engaged in the MIW campaign.  A dedicated maritime support vessel is integral to 
completing this primary objective, while also providing vessel support that can likely be 
purchased, operated and maintained by the AFP into the future.   
Vessel Acquisition Strategies  
In order to adapt to ever-changing warfare environments, the U.S. military has 
utilized a variety of different acquisition strategies—other than through the normal PPBE 
(Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution) process—for acquiring vessels to 
support various operations. Acquisition options now include leasing, chartering and 
purchasing.  Leasing or chartering, however, is not the preferred method of acquisition by 
the U.S. government, which follows a federal budgeting rule of fully funding most assets, 
systems, and platforms, including ships (Daggett & O'Rourke, 2005). To successfully 
adapt and respond to a changing environment, the military should have all acquisition 
options available in order to quickly acquire the needed assets or systems. Unfortunately, 




Vessel Requirements and Capabilities 
As national security objectives continue to project abroad, one of the biggest 
challenges facing the Department of Defense (DoD) is the dilemma of obtaining and 
maintaining forward bases.  SOF is at the forefront of these objectives, and the need to 
maintain operational flexibility to counter political anti-access and irregular warfare 
challenges require some sort of Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) to provide flexible 
and sustainable locations from which to operate.  While it is true that any of our 
combative vessels offers overwhelming firepower dominance over most of our 
adversaries, political sensitivity does not allow for their presence (Corpening, Hurry & 
Young, 2006). 
To further aid in the analysis of vessel capabilities, the OA4604 Wargaming 
Applications Course within the Operations Research curriculum of the Graduate School 
of Operations and Information Sciences (GSOIS) at the Naval Postgraduate School 
assisted the MBA-project team in constructing a wargame scenario.  The MBA-project 
team selected three candidate ships to be used in the scenario taking place in the 
Philippine Islands.  The intent of the wargame and analysis was to compare and contrast 
the capabilities of the three candidate ships and their ability to successfully complete 
anticipated missions in the Philippines.  The candidate ships were the Edison Chouest C-
Champion (current MSV); the Joint Venture High-speed Vessel (HSV), which conducted 
operations in the Philippine Islands in the early part of the decade; and the Littoral 
Combat Ship USS FREEDOM (LCS-1), which will potentially be operating in the 
littorals of Southeast Asia.  Figure E-3 below identifies the three ships with their general 
capabilities as utilized in the wargame. 
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MV C-CHAMPION HSV-2 SWIFT LCS-1 USS FREEDOM
Speed: 12 knots 35 knots 45 knots
Length: 220 feet 331 feet, 4 inches 379 feet
Beam: 56 feet 87 feet, 5 inches 43 feet
Draft: 16.5 feet 11 feet 12.8 feet
Displacement: 2,106 tons 1,463.6 tons 3,089 tons
Civilian Crew: 14 contract mariners 17 contract mariners 0 contract mariners
Military Crew: None Mil crew as needed 40
Weapons:
2 x .50 cal 1 x 25mm, 2 x .50 cal, 
2 x MK-19
1 x 57mm, 4 x .50 cal, RAM
Endurance: 13 days / 10kts 1 day  /  35kts 1 day / 45kts
26 days / 5kts 6 days / 20kts 7 days / 20kts
Helicopters: No Air Assets Helo Pad 2 x MH-60Rs
Small Boat Capacity: 4 x 11m RHIBs 2 x 11m RHIBs 2 x 11m RHIBs
Owned / Chartered: Chartered Chartered Owned  
Figure E-3.   Wargame Scenario Ships (From: Military Sealift Command, 2010 and PEO 
Ships, 2009) 
Cost vs. Capabilities Tradeoffs 
Given a set of capabilities for each vessel type under analysis, we calculated a 
cost per day of putting those capabilities on station at any given time.  Evaluating each 
vessel on a cost-per-day basis provides decision makers with a concrete assessment of the 
costs of deploying a specific capability for a given mission and further simplifies 
determining what those costs are over anticipated mission duration. 
For each vessel, we have collected data on the capital costs (such as acquisition 
and procurement) or lease costs, as well as the operating and support costs. The cost data 
collected for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was taken from reports by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and is based upon U.S. Navy cost estimates. Costs for the Maritime Support 
Vessel (MSV) C-Champion were collected from actual budget-and-spending documents 
at NAVSPECWARCOM. Costs for the High Speed Vessel (HSV) were obtained through 
conversations and correspondence with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and are 
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based upon actual costs in a previous lease contract for the HSV-2 Swift.  Table E-1 
summarizes the cost analysis of the LCS-1, the HSV-2 Swift and the C-Champion. 
Calculating the cost per day to bring a particular vessel and its capabilities into a MIW 
environment allows the decision maker to make informed choices about how to deploy 
different assets in different scenarios. The LCS-1 brings considerable ISR, 
maneuverability, and firepower to any operation relative to the HSV or C-Champion. 
However, it costs approximately $222,000 per day to do so. The HSV offers 
maneuverability and considerable capacity at a rate of approximately $124,000 per day. 
The C-Champion offers utility and economy at approximately $28,000 per day.  
 
Table E-1.   Summary of Vessel Costs per Day 
LCS-1 HSV-2 Swift C-Champion
Unit cost $480,000,000
Baseline Lease Cost $18,250,000 $7,569,000
Operating and Support Costs $61,700,000 $26,845,000 $2,588,000
Cost per day $221,644 $123,548 $27,827.40  
Recommendations 
Maritime irregular warfare is multidimensional although there are identifiable 
activities associated with its conduct (see Figure E-1).  Accordingly, there is no universal 
vessel appropriate for all MIW environments either from a capability or cost perspective. 
To illustrate this point, consider four hypothetical scenarios, similar to real-world areas of 
operation, with varying degrees of demand for each of the mission sets.  These scenarios 
are intended for use as an instrument for discussing vessel applicability within certain 
contexts that may share characteristics of a specific geographic region or area of 
operations.  Discussing each vessel in the context of a scenario demonstrates the types of 
cost and capability trade-offs that must be made when deciding what types of assets and 
resources should be deployed, assuming a mission duration and timeline, to achieve a 




In developing the hypothetical scenarios, MIW activity areas were weighted 
based on the team members’ professional experience and knowledge gained through the 
research process for this project.  Figure E-4 illustrates the distribution of the weighted 









Security Force Operations & Assistance 10% 20% 10% 20%
Civil‐Military Assistance 10% 20% 10%
Counter‐terrorism/piracy/narcotics 30% 70% 10% 50%
Building MaritimePartner Capability & Capacity 40% 60%
Intelligence, Surveillance& Reconnaissance 10% 10% 20%
 
Figure E-4.   MIW Scenarios 
Scenario 1 emphasizes the building of maritime partner capability and capacity, as 
well as counter-terrorism with some degree of civil-military assistance, security force 
operations and assistance and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).  In 
this type of situation, a prolonged presence should be anticipated, and sustained support 
for forces would be required (not dissimilar from the distribution of activities in the 
Philippines as part of OEF-P).  While sleek and swift vessels, such as LCS-1 and HSV 
can offer rapid response to a host of isolated situations within the scenario, their fuel 
consumption alone makes them cost-prohibitive.  Furthermore, any extended presence of 
a gray-hulled vessel is going to attract the attention of the local population.  For extended 
support of SOF in the region, a vessel, such as the MV C-Champion would be preferred. 
In Scenario 2, the highest level of effort is placed upon counter-terrorism, 
counter-piracy, and counter-narcotics.  From a MIW perspective, this would include 
maritime interdiction operations (MIO), which typically employ visit, board, search, and 
seizure (VBSS) teams.  In this type of scenario, a slow, minimally-armed commercial 
vessel would probably be less than ideal, as it is basically a floating target for even 
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primitively equipped aggressors.  Cost would be less of a factor, as a combatant 
commander would want a vessel with combative capability.  A littoral combat ship or 
frigate could perform this mission adequately, and, given an assumed heated environment 
where pirates, terrorists or narco-traffickers are operating with impunity, political 
sensitivity to a warship off the coast would probably be irrelevant, as is the case in the 
vicinity of the Horn of Africa. 
Scenario 3 describes a context somewhat similar to those encountered in Scenario 
1.  However, in this scenario, the overarching emphasis is placed upon building maritime 
partner capability and capacity, as well as conducting civil-military operations.  An 
amphibious warfare ship is most likely optimal, as it provides ample room for 
cooperative military training, berthing, and medical facilities.  These types of vessels 
have a minimal footprint onshore, and their relatively shallow draft allows them to pull 
into austere ports to perform a variety of community-relations projects.   
In the final scenario, we consider a context in which the counter-narcotics mission 
is the primary focus.  A fast and agile vessel would be preferred to intercept the 
stereotypical drug-runner speedboats that are often portrayed in the media.  However, a 
more cost-effective method for counter-narcotics operations might be the employment of 
the PC-1 Cyclone Class.  These patrol craft do not have as sophisticated weapons systems 
as frigates or littoral combat ships, but they do have the speed and firepower to get the 
job done.   
Special Operations Forces Utility 
While there may be some vessels with greater capability that could accomplish a 
particular SOF mission, it is important to recognize that such a vessel may actually have a 
decreased level of SOF utility. Through discussions with members of the SOF 
community, we found that the greater the ship’s capabilities, the less it is dedicated and 
fully available to SOF and therefore the lower the ship’s SOF utility.  Figure E-5 




showing that the two are inversely proportional.  This figure aligns the intensity of the 
political environment with the corresponding vessel that would be required, showing how 




Figure E-5.   SOF Utility vs. Ship Capabilities and Corresponding Political Environment 
In a politically heated environment in which there is little to no governing 
authority, and cost is of little concern, a gray-hulled ship with a full complement of 
warfare capabilities would be required for quick response to a crisis or conflict and to 
take the lead in combat operations.  While a combative may be able to provide support 
for SOF for a particular operation, its sustainability in a loitering role comes into 
question.  Though required for heated conflict, a vessel with multiple warfare capabilities 
will eventually be assigned other tasks to exploit those capabilities, thereby, limiting its 
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role in SOF support.  On the other end of the spectrum, in a calmer setting in which a 
sovereign government exists and SOF is in a long-term advisory role, a cost-effective 
solution offering dedicated support and sustainability is required.  In this type of scenario 
where there is not a direct need for quick, lethal, and decisive force, a platform other than 
a gray-hulled warship may be desirable. 
Conclusion 
Global events constantly challenge the U.S. military to respond to almost any 
scenario.  Policy leaders, both military and civilian, must decide upon the nation’s 
objectives and strategies and then acquire the appropriate capabilities and platforms.  As 
the defense budget becomes more constrained, all viable options to pursue needed 
technologies or platforms should be available.  Our findings are consistent with those of 
Hughes, et al. (2009) in their description of how the Navy can develop “a more 
distributed combat capability for sea control and the projection of national influence from 
the sea” through the acquisition of smaller, single-purpose vessels (Hughes, 2009). 
Because of the cost advantage of the MV C-Champion, two or three of these vessels 
could be deployed in an operational area at the same cost per day or less as an HSV or 
LCS; therefore, ameliorating the disadvantage of being slowest to arrive at a scene of 
action. 
Conventional nation-to-nation conflicts are not the norm in warfare.  The U.S. has 
used military force over 300 times since the American Revolution, and that includes only 
eleven declared wars and some sustained conventional conflicts.  There have been 
roughly 30 major conflicts during the past decade, and only four actually occurred 
between nations (Jogerst, 2009).  History shows us that irregular warfare is a regular 
occurrence, and our Services are shifting to adapt to irregular challenges faced in this 
more common form of warfare.  Gompert and Gordon, et al. (2008) found that the 
average length of an insurgency is more than a decade. If the U.S. is to deploy maritime 
forces in support of counterinsurgency or irregular operations then it is likely that assets 
deployed to support those forces will dwell for an extended period of time. Given the 
differentiated costs of the three vessels we studied as candidates to support MIW, it 
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makes sense to send that vessel that provides the needed capability (as dictated by the 
tasks necessary to achieve a mission within a given region or MIW scenario), with the 
highest SOF utility, at the lowest possible cost.   
Though not the acquisition method typically preferred by the DoD, there are 
benefits to leasing/chartering vessels in support of MIW.  The advantages that 
leasing/chartering could provide are lower upfront costs if the cost of procurement is 
extended over the useful life of vessel and greater response and better value for 
taxpayers’ money especially for those assets and platforms that do not require an 
extensive acquisition process and can be purchased commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or 
contracted through commercial companies. Leasing or chartering offers far more 
flexibility in highly dynamic operational environments since option years can be 
exercised at the discretion of the lessor.  The flexibility of exercising future option allows 
the lessor to find the best vessel to meet current end-user requirements.  Whereas vessel 
procurement incurs a likely 30-year obligation to support, maintain and utilize a vessel 
and limits the capacity to adapt to changing end-user requirements. 
Under a different legislative context or regulatory climate, these options could 
once again be used.  In the near future, the defense budget’s anticipated growth in annual 
weapons investments may cause some politicians to become more open-minded to the 
leasing/chartering option if necessary systems cannot be acquired through traditional 
methods.   
Based on the analysis and recommendations presented in this project, decision-
makers in this arena have a mechanism from which to make a more informed decision 
regarding the acquisition of vessels supporting MIW.  The framework aligns specific 
vessels with their corresponding capabilities, on cost per day basis.  The cost-per-day 
comparison will aid commanders in determining the most appropriate vessel and cost-
effective acquisition method.  
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I.   PREFACE 
The genesis of this MBA Project was a series of conversations that we had with 
Dr. Dick Hoffman of the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a Federally-
Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) at The RAND Corporation, as well 
as CAPT Jeff Kline, USN (ret.) of the Naval Postgraduate School, exploring possible 
project topics.  We learned during these conversations that Dr. Hoffman and some of his 
RAND colleagues were beginning research on a project for U.S. Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM) and Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWARCOM) 
entitled, “Gauging Future Maritime Irregular Warfare: Insights from U.S. 
Counterinsurgency Operations in the Sulu Archipelago.”  Their project’s objective was to 
provide insights to help commanders gauge the personnel and equipment requirements of 
future Maritime Irregular Warfare (MIW) operations by analyzing the impact of those 
operations in an environment—the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippines—that contains a 
significant maritime component. 
Our team became interested in this topic as we were aware that the Navy, as well 
as the other Services, were increasing their focus on irregular warfare (IW) operations, 
making this a current and relevant topic to pursue.  Through more discussions with 
RAND researchers and members of NAVSPECWARCOM N85 Maritime Surface 
Programs, we also learned of the Maritime Support Vessel (MSV) program.  USSOCOM 
and NAVSPECWARCOM were chartering a commercial vessel—the MV C-Champion, 
an Edison Chouest ocean-going tug— to serve as a quasi-Afloat Forward Staging Base 
(AFSB) for Naval Special Warfare (NSW) small- and medium-sized craft and their 






As we learned more about the MSV program, we realized that further research 
and analysis would appropriately complement the RAND study by focusing on one 
specific aspect of MIW, maritime support vessels, and could also provide valuable 
lessons for acquisitions in order to meet the needs of our military when conducting IW 
operations. 
Thus, began our journey. 
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II.  INTRODUCTION 
As the U.S. military increasingly focuses more of its attention on irregular warfare 
(IW), each of the Services is struggling with how they can best leverage their resources 
and capabilities to address current and emerging asymmetric threats.  Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates has made it a priority to shift the Services’ budgets from primarily 
spending on expensive platforms to fight big wars to spending on those capabilities that 
will enhance small war capacity (Naylor, 2009).  This budget refocusing was addressed 
in a speech given by Secretary Gates at the National Defense University in late 2008: 
“[w]e must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic 
conflicts that we neglect to provide, both short-term and long-term, all the capabilities 
necessary to fight and win conflicts, such as we are in today” (Gates, 2008).   
Unfortunately, big and expensive platforms tend to be the commonly chosen 
solution to prosecute contemporary and future conflicts. This fixation on relatively few 
large and costly platforms, or units that are organized to wage big wars, has proven 
difficult to adapt to effectively confront smaller asymmetric and irregular threats.  Large 
bomber attacks and hundreds of thousands of troops did not beat the enemy into 
submission in Vietnam, and they have not worked in Iraq or Afghanistan against 
insurgents.  The military has not completely grasped that many smaller units working 
with indigenous forces and supported by fewer dedicated assets can have much more of 
an effect against a network or an insurgency than can the traditional bulky complement of 
forces the U.S. applies to most threats (Arquilla, 2010). 
From a maritime perspective, addressing MIW will require the concerted efforts 
of all of the maritime forces—the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard.  This 
effort must include U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) or, more 
specifically, its naval component, Naval Special Warfare (NSW), to be truly effective.  
While USSOCOM and NSW have been actively engaging in MIW since their inception, 
the maritime Services have only recently begun to socialize and institutionalize the need 
to focus on IW through shifts in policy and spending.   
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While the maritime forces have only recently started to acknowledge the 
importance of MIW, they do have many inherent attributes that will considerably 
enhance their chances for success when dealing with threats of an irregular nature.  The 
maritime forces have come together in an unprecedented unified strategy for addressing 
current and emerging threats in A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.  In 
this comprehensive strategy, the maritime Services identify their most enduring qualities 
that provide their best chance for facing today’s threats: 
The expeditionary character and versatility of maritime forces provide the 
U.S. the asymmetric advantage of enlarging or contracting its military 
footprint in areas where access is denied or limited.  Permanent or 
prolonged basing of our military forces overseas often has unintended 
economic, social or political repercussions.  The sea is a vast maneuver 
space, where the presence of maritime forces can be adjusted as conditions 
dictate to enable flexible approaches to escalation, de-escalation and 
deterrence of conflicts. (U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Coast Guard, 
2007) 
The Navy has also begun to truly focus its own forces toward MIW by releasing 
two key documents that demonstrate the shifting focus toward engaging more irregular 
threats while still maintaining its “blue-water” superiority and doing this within an 
economic environment that will constantly put pressure on the way it procures for those 
purposes.  The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges, released in early 
2010, speaks to the incorporation of IW in acquisition matters by enhancing the Navy’s 
“ability to address, refine, validate, and incorporate urgent and emerging requirements to 
confront irregular challenges in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution 
[PPBE] process (CNO, 2010, p. 7).”  This relates specifically to the various vessels 
necessary to carry out the Navy’s ever-expanding spectrum of operations.  However, 
acquiring the necessary equipment, technologies and assets to meet operational 
requirements will become much more difficult, as expressed in the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) Guidance for 2010—Executing the Maritime Strategy: 
We are ready and capable today, yet we are stretched in our ability to meet 
additional operational demands.  Our budget is pressurized and we are 
limited in our ability to invest everywhere we see a need…The balance 
between mandatory and discretionary spending at the national level, and 
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high national debt over the next decade, will further increase the fiscal 
pressure on defense accounts.  Growing demand for navy forces and rising 
manpower, operating, and ownership costs challenge our ability to 
increase Fleet capacity while meeting operational demands and our 
commitment to our people.  The year ahead will require discipline, strong 
resolve, and tough investment decisions. (CNO, 2009, p. 1) 
This constantly stressed budget requires the Navy and the other Services to think about 
acquisition in more untraditional ways than ever before.   
As for SOCOM, its budget since 9/11 has increased significantly, along with its 
demand and responsibilities.  While SOCOM has had many successes in acquisitioning 
for smaller, less costly programs and platforms, it has had modest to significant technical, 
programmatic, and funding issues with its more expensive programs (Francis, 2007).  
Most of these problems can be attributed to its acquisition workforce not growing during 
this time frame and its acquisition information management, but the challenges also 
showcase the need for a more integrated acquisition relationship with other Services 
when trying to acquire major platforms through the PPBE process.  That is not to say that 
SOCOM has not done an effective job addressing MIW through other acquisition 
methods in order to provide its forces the necessary platforms. 
As the United States military continuously aligns the appropriate platforms to 
conduct MIW, SOCOM has leased/chartered civilian ships to provide the appropriate 
vessels needed to support operations in Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines (OEF–
P).  Different vessels have been utilized for this mission to meet the shifting requirements 
of not only the combatant commanders but also those of the Philippine Government.  
The primary questions addressed in this study are as follows: 
• Are leased/chartered ships meeting the requirements to best support MIW? 





Using the experience gained in the Philippines during OEF–P as a base-line model, we 
will explore the capabilities of potential vessels relative to the requirements in potential 
MIW environments, and we will take a close look at the acquisition method most 
appropriate for obtaining vessels.  Our study necessarily assumes a given set of mission 
scenarios and a specific operational geography, mission duration, and operating tempo. 
The purpose of this project is to (1) identify the operational and technical 
requirements of U.S. forces utilizing the vessels in support of MIW, taking into 
consideration the current capabilities offered; and (2) conduct research and analysis to 
examine those acquisition methods most appropriate for acquiring, supporting, and 
maintaining vessels in support of MIW.  The conclusions of this study will recommend 
the most effective vessels, in terms of cost and performance, to accomplish specific MIW 
missions and will identify the most effective acquisition method to meet those needs.  
Although we will focus on the Philippines as a base-line case, we will ultimately lay out 
three potential vessels for MIW and state how they would or would not be effective in a 
range of scenarios—one of which we have exercised through a wargame and for which 
we have observable data due to ongoing operations. 
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III.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY 
This study relies on a combination of site visits, interviews with subject-matter 
experts, turn-based scenario-driven wargaming simulation, and cost analysis.  The project 
team partnered with the sponsor, SOCOM/NAVSPECWARCOM N85 Maritime Surface 
Programs, as well as with the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a Federally-
Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) at The RAND Corporation, to 
evaluate capabilities and requirements of several candidate vessels for use in maritime 
irregular warfare and to develop recommendations for future vessel acquisition methods 
to help inform current and future MIW operations.  The researchers have examined 
various data resources, such as the current MSV program management and contracting 
strategy, requirements and capabilities for various vessels in support of MIW, and cost 
and performance data for those vessels (see Figure 1). 
 
METHODOLOGY RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Interviews • Identify the operational and technical 
requirements of U.S. forces utilizing 
MSVs. 
• Identify the acquisition process for 
acquiring vessels in support of MIW. 
Site Visits • Tour the MV C-Commando to gain insight 
from the crew on the vessel’s strengths and 
weaknesses and its overall ability to 
accomplish stated missions and 
requirements. 
Literature Analysis • Identify the capabilities of recently utilized 
and possible alternative MSVs in support 
of MIW. 
Acquisition Data Analysis  • Determine the risks (i.e., cost, schedule, 
performance, etc.) associated with 
different types of acquisition methods. 
Determine the impact that leasing MSVs 
has on operational lifecycles, length of 
service, and operational tempos of crews. 
Determine which type of acquisition 
method is most appropriate for acquiring, 
supporting, and maintaining MSVs in 
support of MIW. 
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METHODOLOGY RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Wargame 
 
• Evaluate the capabilities of three candidate 
vessels for maritime irregular warfare in a 
turn-based, scenario-driven wargame 
simulation. 
Figure 1.   Methods Used to Meet Research Objectives 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows:  It begins with an 
overview of MIW, as well as a background on OEF–P and the operational characteristics 
that drove the requirement for the current MSV.  The next section briefly delves into 
specific acquisition issues necessary to meet the MIW requirement and then explores 
basic concerns regarding acquisition decision-making. Following the chapter on vessel 
acquisition strategies, we look at vessel capabilities, with an emphasis on MIW 
requirements for specified vessels.  Many of the themes and concepts in this chapter 
come from the literature on MIW, as well as from interviews conducted with the Special 
Operations communities at SOCOM, SOCPAC, and NAVSPECWARCOM.   
To further aid us in this analysis, we received assistance from Colonel Jeff 
Appleget (U.S. Army, Retired) and his OA4604 wargaming applications course within 
the Operations Research curriculum of the Graduate School of Operations and 
Information Sciences (GSOIS) at the Naval Postgraduate School. We conducted a 
wargame scenario to provide analysis that compared and contrasted the capabilities of 
three candidate ships—the Edison Chouest MV C–Champion, the High-Speed Vessel 
(HSV), and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS-1)—and their ability to complete anticipated 
missions in the Philippines. 
We support our conclusions with a chapter that narrows down cost-versus-
capability trade-offs.  Combining all the arguments compiled for the various vessels with 
the data we obtained, this project identifies those that best support user requirements 
within a finite number of MIW scenarios and will locate key factors and trade-offs 
associated with different acquisition strategies and processes.  We hope that the findings 
of this project will assist the U.S. military in shaping the way vessels are acquired for the 
end-users actively engaged in Maritime Irregular Warfare. 
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IV.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
This chapter presents previously published works that provide background 
information on a number of subject areas. This background information offers a context 
for the discussion of topics raised throughout the remainder of this MBA project.  First, 
the chapter provides an overview of MIW.  Next, it describes a successful contemporary 
example of MIW (specifically OEF–P) and shows how the requirement for a MSV 
evolved in support of this operation.   
A.  LITERATURE ADDRESSING MARITIME IRREGULAR WARFARE 
To begin this discussion we must first look at the doctrinal definitions of Irregular 
Warfare.  Irregular warfare (IW) is defined in the DoD 3000.07 as “a violent struggle 
among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant 
population(s).  Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it 
may employ the full range of military and other capacities in order to erode an 
adversary’s power, influence, and will” (USD(AT&L), 2008).  The Navy Irregular 
Warfare Office wrote, “IW emphasizes the use of indirect, non-conventional methods and 
means to subvert, attrite, and exhaust an adversary, or render irrelevant, rather than defeat 
him through direct military confrontation (Mullins, 2009).”  Although MIW is not 
defined in Naval or Joint doctrine, in simple terms, it is the maritime component of IW, 
or IW conducted from or on a body of water. 
As defined by the Navy IW Office, the following are operations and activities that 
comprise IW: 
• Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
• Unconventional warfare (UW) 
• Counterterrorism (CT) 
• Foreign internal defense (FID) 
• Stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction operations (SSTRO) 
• Strategic communications 
• Psychological operations (PSYOP) 
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• Information operations (IO) 
• Civil-military operations (CMO) 
• Intelligence and counterintelligence activities 
• Transnational criminal activities (narco-trafficking, illicit arms dealing, 
and illegal financial transactions) that support or sustain IW 
• Law enforcement activities focused on countering irregular adversaries 
(Mullins, 2009) 
Because these are very land-based definitions of IW, it is important to examine the listed 
operations as they relate to MIW.  Figure 2 identifies five fundamental IW operations as 









Figure 2.   Maritime Irregular Warfare Activities 
Security force activities and assistance refers to “exercises and work with foreign 
navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, so as to improve their abilities to 
conduct maritime security operations,” as well as “operations to guard infrastructure, 
facilities, and supply lines” that are of strategic interest to the United States (O'Rourke, 
R., 2009). Civil-military assistance refers to “the use of Navy hospital ships, 
expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval construction units to provide 
medical and construction services,” as well as humanitarian and disaster response and 
relief “in foreign countries as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development 
activities in those countries (O'Rourke, R., 2009).” Counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and 
counter-narcotics activities include the interdiction, destruction, and discouragement 
through presence of illegal trafficking, piracy or terroristic acts in the maritime 
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environment. The building of maritime partner capability and capacity refers to the 
investment of time and resources in developing partner nation navies to function 
effectively in order to deny sanctuaries to pirates, illegal traffickers, violent extremists, 
and other nefarious parties (O'Rourke, R., 2009). Intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance activities refer to those actions undertaken to gain an understanding, as 
well as specific situational dispositions of active or potential threats to U.S. or partner 
nation interests through the use of human and electronic means.  
Although MIW is not currently defined by the Navy or in Joint Doctrine, it has 
been in existence in some form for a very long time, likely since the dawn of sea power.  
When combat took place on the water, a component of unconventional or irregular 
warfare in some shape or fashion inevitably developed to complement traditional 
maritime strategies.  MIW has in the past and will continue in the future to possess the 
potential—with only a minor investment in both personnel and equipment—to shift the 
overall balance of naval warfare (Sutton, 2000). 
Generally speaking, the types of MIW missions conducted over the last 50 years 
in oceans, seas, and inland waters have remained relatively consistent (with the exception 
of technological advances), with naval guerrillas relying mainly on individual combat 
swimmers, high-speed boats, or unconventional submarine platforms for subsurface 
attacks on shipping vessels and for infiltrating forces ashore (Sutton, 2000).  Today’s 
naval special operations forces conduct similar missions involving amphibious raids, 
unconventional warfare, and clandestine reconnaissance operations in the littoral 
battlefields of today just as their predecessors did almost 50 years ago in Vietnam 
(Sutton, 2000).  During Operation Market Time (1965–1973), the U.S. Navy performed 
interdiction missions with Swift boats, Navy patrol gunboats, and U.S. Coast Guard 
cutters to stop troops and supplies flowing from North Vietnam to South Vietnam by sea.  
Swift boats were also used on the rivers of the Mekong Delta to disrupt North 
Vietnamese and Vietcong supply traffic during Operation Game Warden, initiated in 




MIW missions to secure transportation routes, reduce infiltration routes, and establish a 
patrolled waterway interdiction barrier from Tay Ninh to the Gulf of Siam, utilizing 
conventional and special-operations forces.  
Figure 3 identifies operations, tactics, and activities comprising MIW from the 
friendly, or U.S., side and the enemy’s side.  These operations and tactics have been long 
utilized by both the U.S. and its adversaries and are likely to continue to be used in the 
foreseeable future.  Since there is not a ready definition of MIW, the activities listed 
below quickly identify activities that should likely be included in a broad definition of 
MIW and establish a framework of MIW for our continuing research on vessels utilized 
to support MIW.  
 
Friendly Operations, Tactics & 
Activities Comprising MIW 
Enemy Operations, Tactics & Activities 
Comprising MIW 
Show of Force: providing conspicuous 
naval forces to deter aggression  
Hit-and-run attacks by small boats  
Maritime Interdiction Ops (MIO) & Visit, 
Board, Search and Seizure Ops (VBSS)  
Maritime suicide attacks using light 
fiberglass boats  
Maritime mobility in support of Special 
Operations and agencies  
Frogmen to sink opponent’s vessels  
Sea-based forces afloat in support of 
operations ashore  
Smuggling of equipment/drugs on various 
vessels  
Maritime raids; hit-and-run attacks by 
small boats; frogman ship attacks  
Piracy and hijacking of vessels  
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 
(ISR) of areas of interest ashore  
Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance  
Training, advising and assisting partner 
nations’ maritime forces (proxies)   
Invasion of territory via maritime routes  
Civil affairs and construction activities to 
develop maritime infrastructure  
Financial payments or civil support to local 
populace 
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
from a sea base or at sea  
Humanitarian assistance at sea 
Figure 3.   Friendly and Enemy Components of Operations, Tactics & Activities 
Comprising Maritime Irregular Warfare (From: DeLuca & Hoffman, 
2010) 
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B.  A CONTEMPORARY CASE OF MIW: OPERATION ENDURING 
FREEDOM–PHILIPPINES 
The case of OEF–P is a contemporary example of MIW.  Since 2001, the United 
States has deployed Special Operations Forces (SOF) to the Philippines in support of 
OEF–P for counterinsurgency and irregular-warfare operations.  A majority of the 
irregular operations occur in the Sulu Archipelago, and these operations require a 
significant maritime component in order to constantly adapt to the evolving environment. 
As with most IW operations, the mission has evolved over time, and the requirements are 
continuously changing or being refined to adapt to the enemy and the current mission set 
along with the advancements of host-nation forces.   
The Philippines, slightly larger than the state of Arizona, total approximately 
300,000 square kilometers and is encased by 36,289 kilometers of coastline. The territory 
contains over 7,000 islands with over 3,200 kilometers of open waterways connecting the 
islands (Philippines, 2009).  The numerous islands and connected waterways pose an 
obvious challenge to military forces, enabling terrorist forces to move quickly from one 
island to another and making it difficult for opposing military forces to contain them.  
Due to the location and geography of the Philippines, U.S. Naval forces perform both IW 
and MIW tasks and mission sets to successfully support their host-nation counterparts in 
defeating terrorist forces while accomplishing their foreign internal defense mission.  The 
very nature of the geography in the Philippines requires a dedicated vessel to support 
maritime operations. 
1.  Background 
The United States and the Republic of the Philippines (RP) have maintained close 
relations for over 100 years, starting during the U.S. colonial period from 1898 to 1946.  
The U.S. officially closed Subic Naval Base and Clark Air Base in the Philippines in 
1992.  However, cooperation in counter terrorism efforts have brought the two countries 
even closer together in recent years, especially since the attacks against the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001 and the initiation of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  In May 
2003, the Bush Administration declared increased military assistance and designated the 
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RP as a major non-NATO ally.  The basis for this bilateral relationship is the security 
alliance between the U.S. and the RP, counter-terrorism cooperation, trade and 
investment ties, and shared democratic values (Lum & Niksch, 2009).  One reason the 
bilateral relationship is important is because approximately 3 million Filipino-Americans 
live in the U.S., which makes them the second largest Asian-American group in the 
United States.  Filipinos also constitute the largest number of immigrants serving in the 
U.S. military, and an estimated 250,000 Americans live in the RP (Lum & Niksch, 2009).  
This relationship is also important because it has allowed the U.S. to establish a semi-
permanent base south of Luzon for the first time since World War II and carried 
additional benefits of positioning the U.S. to combat Islamic terrorism in the region, as 
well as the future containment of nearby China (Kaplan, 2005).  Admiral Keating, former 
commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, stated that it is likely that the U.S. will need to 
continue its efforts in combating terrorism in the Philippines for the foreseeable future:   
With U.S. Government assistance, the Government of the Philippines 
reduced transnational terrorist organizations’ capability, mobility, 
resources, and popular support to conduct attacks against U.S. and 
Philippine interests. Although these transnational terrorist threats are 
substantially diminished, they have not been eliminated, and the 
underlying conditions for a stable and secure southern Philippines have 
not been fully achieved. Success will require a persistent interagency 
approach. (Keating, 2009) 
2.   OEF–P Strategy and Mission 
OEF–P is a joint operation conducted by Special Operations Command Pacific 
(SOCPAC) and has been active in various forms in the southern Philippines since March 
2001.  The U.S. also had members of the Army’s 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (1st 
SFG(A)) actively involved in the RP prior to the events of 9/11.  From March to July 
2001, elements of the 1st Battalion, 1st SFG (A) conducted an advisory and assistance 
mission with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) by helping the AFP develop 
plans to target terrorist organizations.   
By the end of 2000, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) had kidnapped more than 50 
western hostages and obtained more than $20 million in ransom for their release.  This 
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advisory and assistance mission became significantly more important on May 21, 2001, 
when the ASG kidnapped more than a dozen important Filipinos and three U.S. citizens, 
including a missionary couple from a resort on the Island of Palawan (Farris, 2009).  The 
hostages were transported to the ASG’s jungle sanctuary on the island of Basilan and 
held for ransom. This event; occurring in the aftermath of 9/11, led SOCPAC, the U.S. 
Pacific Command (USPACOM), the State Department, and the Bush Administration to 
expand the GWOT in order to more aggressively target the ASG by establishing OEF–P. 
USPACOM obtained permission to establish Camp Luzon and train an AFP Light 
Reaction Company (LRC) as a national counter-terrorist group for the Philippines in the 
role of first response to an escalating terrorist threat. After the attack on Palawan Island in 
May 2001, President Bush pledged $150 million in counter-terrorism assistance to the 
Philippines, including $100 million of military equipment and funds for the expansion of 
the LRC training camp into OEF–P (Palilonis, 2009).  Under OEF–P, the Joint Special 
Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF–P) operates hand-in-hand with the AFP to 
conduct civil/military and combat operations and to limit the power and scope of the Al 
Qaeda-linked ASG and other terrorist organizations operating in the area (Palilonis, 
2009).   
As of January 2009, the JSOTF–P mission statement stated that “JSOTF–P, in 
coordination with the U.S. Country Team, conducts Foreign Internal Defense (FID) with 
the Republic of the Philippines Security Forces in order to defeat Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) 
and ASG High-Value Individuals and neutralize enemy safe havens” (Farris, 2009).  As 
defined in Joint Publication 1-02, “the country team is the senior, in-country, U.S. 
coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mission, 
and composed of the senior member of each represented U.S. department or agency 
(CJCS, 2007).”  This mission statement emphasizes working with the existing and well-
established U.S. country team “by, with, and through” legitimate Filipino security forces 
to neutralize JI and ASG and to eliminate the conditions that allow them to continue 
operations against the Filipino people and government.   
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JSOTF–P has designed their operations along four simple lines. 
• Capacity building 
• Targeted Civil Military Operations (CMO) 
• Information gathering and sharing 
• Information/influence operations   
These actions are applied along one or more of these lines of operation, focused on 
gaining and maintaining the support of the civilian population while neutralizing terrorist 
leaders, networks and sanctuaries.  The AFP plans and executes all of these operations 
with members of JSOTF–P providing direction, training and informational support as 
needed (Farris, 2009).  As American participation in actual combat operations is 
prohibited by the Philippine constitution, it is critical to note that the U.S. has a strictly 
advisory role in OEF–P. 
3.   OEF–P Organization 
The JSOTF–P operating forces are comprised of 500–600 personnel from all four 
branches of Service, including Army SOF, Navy SEALs, Air Force special operators, and 
support personnel from all four U.S. military Services (JSOTF–P PAO, 2009).  The 
Army typically provides soldiers to augment the JSOTF–P staff, a reinforced Special 
Forces Company, a Civil Affairs (CA) Company, and a military information support team 
(MIST).  The Navy typically provides personnel to augment both the JSOTF–P staff and 
a Naval Special Warfare Task Unit (NSWTU) consisting of a SEAL platoon, a 
supporting boat detachment, and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) detachment.  
The Air Force also provides personnel to augment the JSOTF–P staff, liaison teams to 
coordinate with the Philippines Air Force (PAF), a weather detachment, and several 
fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft to support operations.  Lastly, JSOTF–P is supported by 
general-purpose forces (GPF)—usually from the Marine Corps—or an Army infantry 
unit to provide security for base camps and facilities, as well as to reinforce or support 
operations when needed (Farris, 2009). 
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The JSOTF–P Headquarters is located in the western archipelago town of 
Zamboango on the island of Mindanao and is staffed with fewer than 70 personnel.  The 
primary elements of JSOTF–P are the reinforced Special Forces Company, the NSWTU, 
and the CA Company.  The core elements are augmented by conventional forces and by 
other supporting personnel, whenever and wherever necessary and personnel are task 
organized into cross-functional teams.  These teams are organized into three subordinate 
headquarters of approximately 100–150 personnel each and are known as Task Force 
(TF) SULU, TF MINDANAO, and TF ARCHIPELAGO.  Figure 4 depicts the typical 
area of operations for OEF–P.   
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Figure 4.   Example JSOTF–P Area of Operations (From: JSOTF–P PAO, 2009) 
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Due to the size and nature of this operation, JSOTF–P has relatively few organic 
assets to support their mission.  The U.S. has intentionally limited the number of aircraft 
and ISR assets to reduce the American footprint in compliance with the host nation’s 
wishes and legal requirements. There are typically ten or fewer aircraft (Farris, 2009) and 
a relatively small number of tactical-level Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), resulting 
in a limited set of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.  
Military fixed-wing air support consists of a handful of aircraft, some of which are 
provided by contract.  These aircraft essentially provide logistical support and personnel 
transport but lack offensive capability.  Rotary-wing aircraft are also limited for JSOTF–
P, consisting primarily of two types of Blackhawk helicopters and contracted helicopter 
support, which, again, are mainly designed for logisitical support and troop transport.  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) are equipped only with cameras and have limited 
endurance capability to support ongoing operations. Due to the jungle terrain, Unmanned 
Aerial Vehicles used in support of OEF–P are much more restricted in OEF–P than in 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; thick foilage reduces UAV visibility and typically 
allows only observation of roads, clearings and waterways.  
4.   Terrorist Organizations 
The Muslim terrorist and insurgency situation in the southern Philippines has 
become increasing complex since 2002, when JSOTF–P and the AFP conducted their 
successful operation against the ASG on the Basilan Island off the southwestern tip of the 
big island of Mindanao.  Though other developments could worsen the overall situation 
in the southern Philippines and in the entire country as a whole,  one of the worrisome 
trends is the growing cooperation between ASG and several major Moro Islamic Front 
commands and elements of JI on Mindanao (Lum & Niksch, 2009).  
The ASG is a small, violent, faction-ridden Muslim group that operates in western 
Mindanao and on the Sulu islands extending from Mindanao.  It has a record of killings 
and hostage-taking for ransom and has had previous, sporadic links with Al Qaeda.  The 
U.S. focus on ASG is complicated by the broader insurgent problem in the southern 
Philippines, including the existence of two separatist movements—the Moro National 
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Liberation Front (MNLF) and the Moro Islamic Front.  These organizations represent 
Moro ethnic and religious groups, which form a majority of the population in several 
provinces on Mindanao Island (Lum & Niksch, 2009). 
5.   Operations 
The members of JSOTF–P operate by, with, and through its Philippine Armed 
Forces counterparts in a strictly non-combat role to perform the following functions. 
• Bring humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected areas through the 
following programs: 
• Medical and Dental Civic Action Programs 
• Veterinary Civic Action Programs 
• Engineering Civil Action Programs 
• Share information with the AFP. The U.S. shares intelligence data and 
other information to assist AFP in planning future operations. 
• Build capacity through subject-matter expert exchange programs to share 
lessons learned on the following subjects: 
• Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
• Tactical Combat Casualty Care 
• Marksmanship and Small Unit Tactics 
• Civil Military Operations Planning 
• Maritime Operations 
• Casualty Evacuation (JSOTF–P PAO, 2009) 
As the ASG has been a critical focus of the military operations, JSOTF–P has 
reduced the ASG’s size from approximately 2,000 fighters in 2001 to fewer than 300 as 
of early 2009.  JSOTF–P’s advisory role of the AFP has also reduced the number of 
terrorist attacks in the region.  The defense reforms and partnering missions with the AFP 
have also been effective in building the AFP’s logistics and maintenance capacity.  In 
2001, AFP helicopters were only mission capable 15% of the time, whereas in 2007 the 
mission-capable percentage rose to 80% as a direct result of improvements in 
maintenance and logistics training (Brookes, 2007).   
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6.   U.S. Foreign Assistance 
After 9/11, the Philippines received a ten-fold increase in U.S. military assistance.  
Assistance jumped from $1.9 million in 2001 to $19 million in 2002.  The primary goals 
of U.S. assistance include the following: fighting terrorism using both military and non-
military means; supporting the peace process in Muslim Mindanao; promoting health and 
eductation programs, specifically in conflict-ridden areas of Mindanao; increasing 
private-sector competiveness; and promoting good governance (Lum & Niksch, 2009).  
The consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2008, Section 699E, provided approximately 
$30 million for Foreign Military Financing for the Philippines (Lum & Niksch, 2009).  
The House and Senate passed Continuing Resolution (CR), H.R. 2638 (the Consolidated 
Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act, 2009) in September 
2008.  This bill was signed into law as P.L. 110-329.  The CR for FY 2009 continued 
most foreign-operations funding through March 6, 2009, at FY 2008 levels (Lum & 
Niksch, 2009).   
7.  Maritime Aspect of OEF–P 
Since the majority of the insurgency takes place in the Sulu Archipelago region of 
the Philippines, these operations require a significant maritime component to constantly 
adapt to the evolving operational environment.  Further, the Naval Marines and 
Philippine Naval Special Operations Unit (NAVSOU) SEALs of the AFP are the primary 
force utilized to confront the ASG and JI in this area.  As a result, three different types of 
martitime support vessels have been previously or currently assigned to TF Archipelago 
to support the Naval Marines and SEALs in conducting their operations.  One of the 
primary maritime missions is the establishment of the Coast Watch South (CWS).  The 
basic aim of the CWS is to promote maritime domain awareness and systematically 
augment Manila’s ability to mitigate the occurrence of maritime threats in zones around 
the Sulu-Sulawesi-Sabah tri-border area.  The broad objective is to establish a string of 
monitoring stations that have both surveillance and interdicition capabilities and to 
connect these platforms through a central command center managed by inter-agency 
personnel but headed by the AFP (DeLuca & Hoffman, 2010). 
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8.  Vessel Characteristics 
Specifically in OEF–P, maritime forces are used to support and sustain distributed 
U.S. outposts that are seeking to secure the local population and conduct civil military 
operations.  These operations include logisitcs and intelligence support, as well as an 
afloat forward-staging base or operating base.  They also include providing maritime 
quick reaction-force deployment and support training of AFP soldiers and security forces.  
A vessel that supports maritime forces operating in this irregular environment needs to be 
able to act as a forward staging base, provide maritime mobility, refuel and rearm small 
crafts, such as the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 11-meter Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB) and the MKV Special Operations Craft (SOC), and provide a platform for 
maritime-security and humanitarian-assistance planning and operations.  The 
overarching task of U.S. maritime forces has been to build capacity amongst the AFP’s 
Naval Marines and SEALs through training, equipping and operational support.  With 
this task in mind, the U.S. has utilized various maritime-support vessels throughout OEF–
P, relying on lease/charter agreements and vessels of opportunity to provide direct 
logistics and employment support to SOF operations engaged in the MIW campaign.  A 
dedicated maritime support vessel is integral to completing this primary objective.  
Additionally, it is important to build the capacity of the host nation forces, while 
providing vessel support that can likely be purchased, operated and maintained by the 
AFP into the future.   
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V.  VESSEL ACQUISITION STRATEGIES  
It is in the nature of MIW for requirements to change quickly.  In order to adapt to 
ever-changing warfare environments, the U.S. military has utilized a variety of different 
acquisition strategies—other than through the normal PPBE (Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution) process—for acquiring vessels to support various operations. 
Acquisition options now include leasing, chartering and purchasing.  Leasing or 
chartering, however, is not the preferred method of acquisition by the U.S. government, 
which follows a federal budgeting rule of fully funding most assets, systems, and 
platforms, including ships (Daggett & O'Rourke, 2005).  
This chapter will begin with a short overview of the three main acquisition 
strategies that the U.S. utilizes—procurement, purchasing, and leasing.  For the purposes 
of this study, we will focus primarily on leased or chartered vessels—the preferred 
method utilized by SOCOM—and how those leases or charters are facilitated by the 
Military Sealift Command (MSC).  Following a short discussion of MSC and its 
relationships and responsibilities involving leases and charters, we will then present a 
case study of the current MSV program.   
A.   ACQUISITION METHODS 
1. Procurement 
Procurement is the most common acquisition method the U.S. uses to acquire 
vessels.  The primary reason this method is preferred is that it avoids the use of 
incremental funding—dividing a vessel’s cost into two or more annual portions or 
increments—for acquiring vessels.  Incremental funding has the potential to result in an 
incomplete, unusable end item if future annual appropriations are not approved.  The 
policy of fully funding procurement programs is one that congress, the Government 
Accountability Office, and the DoD have reaffirmed many times since the 1950s 
(Daggett & O'Rourke, 2005). This policy is meant to facilitate the responsibility of  
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congressional oversight of procurement programs.  This fully funded policy is now 
threatened by increased budgetary pressures, decreased purchasing power, and increased 
costs of weapons systems.   
Every acquisition process begins with an end-user requirement.  From that 
requirement or need, military and government officials determine the best course of 
action to acquire whichever platform or technology best meets that needed requirement.  
If no commercial asset is available or suitable for military use, then the government often 
funds research and development in hopes of procuring this need. After the military 
identifies a need, a contracting officer receives a consolidated list of requirements and 
then solicits bids from different contractors.  For any acquisition option, the list of 
requirements that are sent out to potential contractors is an extremely important part of 
this process. This list must be as accurate as possible because accuracy allows for not 
only a better product but also a more accurate and dependable budget in relation to a 
particular program.  Once this list is distributed and a contractor is selected, the parties 
agree upon a contract.  Often contracts are separated into phases, starting with research 
and development and followed by production, delivery, and maintenance (Hensley, 
2008).   
2. Purchasing   
When procurement methods are unable to meet the needs of the military, 
purchasing an existing suitable vessel provides an avenue to quickly field the needed 
equipment or platform.  Ownership of equipment or assets is transferred to the 
government upon payment.  When dealing with vessels, the main issue usually entails the 
level of conversion that must take place in order to bring the commercial ship up to 
military specifications.  Full up-front purchasing is the most common method, but there 
are also lease-to-purchase options that allow for testing, fielding, and evaluating prior to 
actually buying the piece of equipment or asset.   
Of the many governing directives concerning lease-purchase decisions, the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) explains that “the purchase method is appropriate 
if the equipment will be used beyond the point in time when cumulative leasing costs 
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exceed the purchase costs” and that “agencies should not rule out the purchase method of 
equipment acquisition in favor of leasing merely because of the possibility that future 
technological advances might make the selected equipment less desirable” (GSA et al., 
2010, Subpart 7.4). 
Acquisitions through purchasing are also procured by using the General Schedule 
Administration (GSA) contract, GSA Schedules and other Simplified Acquisition 
Procedures.  Within the context of the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) and 
the Federal Acquisition Reform Act (FARA), an expanded definition of “commercial 
items” that are considered “commercial off-the-shelf” (COTS) and are eligible for 
procurement include any item that has evolved from commercial items, modified to meet 
government requirements, listed in the GSA catalog with accepted market pricing.  These 
items only have to be offered for sale to the general public in the commercial market. 
The use of Other Transaction Authority also provides a method of purchasing 
research and development prototypes and technologies available in the market today to 
meet requirements of the future and has provided a means to rapidly procure Combatant 
Craft and boats for the U.S. Navy and USSOCOM (G. A. Weaver, personal 
communication, January 26, 2010). 
3. Leases  
Leases have historically met with immense resistance by the federal government, 
as in the Air Force’s recent attempt to lease Boeing refueling tankers (Tirpak, 2004).  All 
government agencies and services are responsible for proper application of the relevant 
definitions, principles, and guidelines when engaging in lease-versus-purchase decisions 
(San Miguel, Shank & Summers, 2005). 
Leasing and purchasing have different effects on the overall Department of 
Defense and national budget.  The Office of Management and Budget defines 
scorekeeping as “the process of estimating the budgetary effects of legislation […] on the 
limits set in the budget resolution or legislation.  Scorekeeping uses several metrics to 
compare these legislative effects, such as budget authority, receipts, outlays, the surplus 
deficit, and the public debt limit” (OMB, 2009). 
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a.. Types of Leases 
To better understand the concepts associated with lease-purchase 
decisions, OMB Circular No. A-11 (Appendix B) provides useful definitions to 
differentiate between a lease-purchase, an operating lease, and a capital lease: 
Lease-purchase means a type of lease in which ownership of the asset is 
transferred to the government at, or shortly after, the end of the lease term. 
Such a lease may or may not contain a bargain-price purchase option (p. 6, 
Appendix B). 
Capital lease means any lease, other than a lease -purchase, that does not 
meet the criteria of an operating lease (p.6, Appendix B). 
Operating lease means a lease that meets all the criteria listed below. If 
the criteria are not met, the lease will be considered to be a capital lease or 
a lease-purchase, as appropriate. Multi-year service contracts (e.g., 
grounds maintenance) and multi-year purchase contracts for expendable 
commodities (e.g., aspirin) will be considered operating leases. Agencies 
should consult with OMB in cases where a service contract requires a 
private contractor to construct or acquire a capital asset solely or primarily 
to provide the service to the government (Appendix B, p. 6). 
• Ownership of the asset remains with the lessor during the term of 
the lease and is not transferred to the government at or shortly after 
the end of the lease term. 
• The lease does not contain a bargain-price purchase option. 
• The lease term does not exceed 75 percent of the estimated 
economic life of the asset. 
• The present value of the minimum lease payments over the life of 
the lease does not exceed 90 percent of the fair market value of the 
asset at the beginning of the lease term. 
• The asset is a general purpose asset rather than a special purpose 
asset of the government and is not built to the unique specifications 
of the government as lessee. 
• There is a private-sector market for the asset. 
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b. Risk Associated with Leases 
Risk refers to the level of private-sector risk. Lease-purchase agreements 
are scored as having or not having substantial private risk, depending on the level of 
private-sector risk. Substantial private risk indicates the absence of substantial 
government risk. Risk is defined within the context of the project. If the project is less 
governmental in nature, the private sector risk is considered to be higher. 
The following types of illustrative criteria indicate ways in which a project 
is considered less governmental: 
• There is no provision for government financing and no explicit 
government guarantee of third-party financing. 
• Risks incident to ownership of the asset (e.g., financial responsibility for 
destruction or loss of the asset) remains with the lessor unless the 
government was at fault for such losses.  
• The asset is a general-purpose asset rather than a special-purpose asset of 
the government and is not built to the unique specifications of the 
government as lessee. 
• There is a private-sector market for the asset. 
• The project is not constructed on government land. 
c. Guidelines for Making the Lease or Purchase Decision 
Three main measurements—utility value, investment costs, and period 
before obsolescence—have been used over the last few years to form the basis of 
discussions dealing with lease-purchase decisions. This system of measurement has been 
utilized recently, though some say that it is not used enough or given enough weight.  
Each measurement element is detailed below with some associated questions to guide 
officials as they decide whether to buy or lease (Hensley, 2008). 
• Utility Value: 
• How useful is the total system, including its equipment, facilities 
and people?  
• Does it have many other applications or is its value limited to 
narrow parameters requiring specific threats or operational 
applications and environments?  
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• What about the equipment needed to field it? Can any of it be used 
or modified to support other systems, thereby increasing its own 
utility value? 
• What about the utility value of the people required for operation 
and maintenance? Are not they and their training a part of this 
system’s acquisition?  
• Investment Costs: 
• Is the system expensive, in real terms, considering its total cost, 
including its people and their training?  
• If a new building must be built to house the new system and its 
people, is not the cost of that building also part of the system’s 
cost?  
• What about the investment in repair parts, their handling and 
repair, the storage equipment to stock them, and all the other 
related expenses involved in the system’s acquisition, including 
new transportation vehicles and security requirements? 
• Period before Obsolescence: 
• What if it is likely that a smaller, simpler, and more portable 
system will come along at a lower cost to buy and operate? After 
all, we are talking about a relatively new and changing technology 
in almost every aspect of today’s military (Tompkins, 2008). 
d.    Leasing Background  
As the U.S. military adapts to changing operational environments, it must 
find new capabilities and platforms to address ever-changing requirements. To 
successfully adapt and respond to a changing environment, the military should have all 
acquisition options available in order to quickly acquire the needed assets or systems. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case when leasing is proposed.  The military is constrained 
by a highly bureaucratic and often slow-moving acquisition system and by the politics of 
Washington, which, since the 1980s, have made the leasing of necessary platforms very 
unattractive to commercial companies (Hensley, 2008).   
While this subject has not been extensively discussed elsewhere, San 
Miguel, Shank and Summers (2005) take an analytical look at the history of one specific 
successful leasing program—Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPSs), which they wrote in  
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response to the unsuccessful attempt by the Air Force to lease refueling tankers from 
Boeing in 2003.  The Boeing case brought the issue of leasing back to the forefront of 
discussions about military acquisitions.   
The authors of that study begin their analysis with a short synopsis of 
historical lease arrangements within the Navy.  They also provide examples that date 
back to World War II, when the Navy contracted over 450 supply ships with merchant 
marine crews; to the Korean conflict, in which the Navy contracted more than 200 ships; 
and to the Vietnam War, in which T1 refueling tankers were used.  
The authors contend that the MPS program created such a backlash from 
Washington politicians that lawmakers passed subsequent laws to ensure that a 
recurrence of such a situation would be prevented in the future. Representatives passed 
these laws in response to perceptions that the program circumvented the acquisition 
process and consequently denied the possibilities of job creation to their constituency.  It 
is also likely that this program denied elected officials the ever-important political capital 
they needed in order to maintain their constituencies’ votes and support.   
After the authors explain the various stakeholders’ points of view and 
financial reasoning, they present their own analytical comparisons. Most of the analytical 
data and conclusions that San Miguel, Shank and Summers propose are based on the 
assumptions, tax benefits, interest rates, and residual values of the period in question.  
The authors show how the different viewpoints should have been computed based on the 
financial and accounting principles of the time after discounting the political motives that 
each stakeholder used to skew the numbers to best support its side’s desired outcome.  
Many of the stakeholders in the MPS case adjusted interest rates and made many 
different assumptions based on their political views.  The authors attempt to analyze the 
case dispassionately using the basic assumptions required to determine the most realistic 
model for comparing leasing-versus-purchasing options for the MPSs.   
The authors concluded that, based on their interpretations, leasing was 
substantially more cost effective than purchasing by about $64.4 million per ship.  The 
 42
$64.4 million figure includes the reduced costs associated with adhering to commercial 
shipbuilding standards instead of military standards, as well as the costs associated with 
significantly decreasing the acquisition process period from five to seven years to about 
two years.  
From a SOF perspective, another extremely successful example was the 
“Mobile Sea Bases” that the U.S. leased during “The Tanker War” (1987–1988) in the 
Persian Gulf to support Navy SEALs and the Special Operations Air Regiment (SOAR, 
the “Nightstalkers”).  To respond to Iranian mine attacks of oil-tankers, the U.S. needed 
to station U.S. forces in the northern part of the Gulf for prolonged periods of time and 
the occasional U.S. warships transiting the area were not able to maintain a strong enough 
presence to effect any change in Iranian activities.  When Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
denied the establishment of land bases on their soil due to concerns over domestic issues 
that would ensue from having foreign forces present there, the U.S. decided to lease two 
oil field support barges to provide a “base” while maintaining a low profile as to not 
provoke Iran.  Each “Mobile Sea Base” was anchored in international waters in the 
northern Gulf and had the combined ability to endure the harsh Gulf conditions while 
having the mobility to move frequently to support operations in various locations and/or 
to maintain operational security.  The lease for both barges was for $21,000 per day, 
which included provisions for supplying water, fuel, and for housekeeping services 
provided for by an embarked civilian contract crew (Zatarain, 2008). 
B.   MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND OVERVIEW 
Military Sealift Command’s history can be traced back to World War II.  At that 
time, four separate government agencies managed sea transportation for the military 
services.  Shortly after the war, these agencies were consolidated into the Military Sea 
Transportation Service (MSTS) to become the sole managing agency for the DoD’s 
ocean transportation needs.  MSTS was renamed Military Sealift Command during the 




The Military Sealift Command is responsible for providing sealift and ocean 
transportation for all military Services and other government agencies, as well as 
administering DoD auxiliary ship leases. Figure 5 depicts the MSC chain of command.  
MSC is organized around four mission areas, each of which is managed by one of the 
following Program Offices. 
• Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force or NFAF (PM1) 
• Special Mission  (PM2) 
• Prepositioning  (PM3) 
• Sealift  (PM4) 
Military Sealift Command reports through three distinct and separate chains of 
command. 
• To U.S. Fleet Forces Command for Navy transport matters,  
• To U.S. Transportation Command for defense transportation matters, and  
• To the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and 




Figure 5.   MSC Chain of Command (From: Military Sealift Command, 2010) 
Although MSC has an annual operating budget of approximately $3 billion, it 
receives no direct funding appropriations to support command operations.  MSC finances 
its operations through the use of working capital funds.  Working capital funds are 
accounts that are reimbursed by direct appropriations or by funds transferred into the 
account by the various MSC customers. MSC draws funds from the working capital fund 
to pay for command operations.  The goal of a working capital fund is to breakeven 
rather than make a profit the way a private company would operate.   
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MSC utilizes two working capital funds. 
• The Navy Working Capital Fund, which supports Navy fleet commanders 
and other Department of Defense entities 
• The Transportation Working Capital Fund, which supports sealift services 
To comply with the Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369), MSC 
is obligated to seek full and open competition in the procurement of ship charters. 
According to this act, MSC requires solicitations of offers to specify the agency’s needs 
in a way that promotes competition and requires that offers be evaluated solely on the 
factors specified in the solicitation.  The act also states that the type of specification 
included in the solicitation depends on the needs of the agency and the market available 
to satisfy those needs.  According to the GAO, the trade-off between military use and 
cost should be left to the procuring agency, which is best able to assess its true needs 
(Ferber, 1989). 
MSC charters ships under three types of contracts. 
• Bareboat: a contract for the exclusive use of a ship for a defined period of 
time, with MSC being responsible for the crewing, operating, supplying, 
and servicing of the ship. These types of charters are infrequent. 
• Spot: a contract, at a fixed fee, for as little as a single voyage, with the 
owner operating the ship and paying all costs out of the fixed fee 
• Time: a contract for the use of a ship and its crew for a specified period of 
time, with MSC paying the owner a fee to operate it and reimbursing the 
owner for fuel costs and port charges (Ferber, 1989) 
Time charters are the bulk of MSC’s business and are the focus of this study since 
it pertains to the current MSV program.  These charters consist of time periods ranging 
from six months to five years. Since FY85, however, MSC has restricted time charters to 
17 months with provisions for up to two 17-month options to comply with a legislative 
limit of 18 months.  Section 1011 of the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense 
Authorization Act (P.L. 110–181) requires congressional notification, a lease-versus-
purchase cost analysis, as well as plans to procure a vessel that meets DoD requirements 
when the analysis indicates it is in the best interest of the government for all charter-
vessel contracts with performance periods to be in excess of two years. 
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Some important cost definitions to understand when dealing with chartered 
vessels include the following. 
• Charter Hire Per Diem, the average daily cost of chartering a vessel.  It 
includes the fixed-price cost of the vessel operation when under contract, 
such as maintenance and repair, spare parts, crew wages and benefits, 
provisions, supplies, etc.  It also includes anticipated capital costs (loans, 
etc.) associated with a vessel.  
• Operating Per Diem, the average daily cost of operating a government-
owned vessel, exclusive of maintenance and repairs. Costs associated with 
shipbuilding are covered in another line. 
• Daily M&R Costs, the daily average of estimated maintenance and repair 
(M&R) costs of a government-owned vessel. 
Meeting the DoD’s transportation requirements at the lowest cost is MSC’s goal 
in awarding time charters. The most common acquisition is the Low Price/Technically 
Acceptable method.  In this procedure, MSC requests proposals from as many ship 
owners or operators as it can identify and selects the lowest-cost, technically qualified 
offer.  In order to attract more bidders, MSC attempts to accommodate offerors’ concerns 
by not compromising customers’ needs or other requirements.  In one case, MSC 
extended the delivery date and allowed for additional “reasonable-cause” delay on one 
Request for Proposal (RFP) in response to an offeror’s complaint that the time originally 
allowed may not be sufficient for ship modifications or construction that would be 
needed to meet requirements (Ferber, 1989).  As in the commercial world, more 
competition means lower costs. 
There have been some stakeholders that have raised concerns in the past over how 
much influence MSC has over the administration of these contracts.  Because MSC is a 
government-induced quasi-monopoly, some sponsors, like the Navy or SOCOM, have 
believed that MSC has had limited incentives to control costs.  Due to its monopolistic 
nature, some sponsors—along with some in the commercial shipping industry—have 
believed that MSC has had the potential to take advantage of its customers, which tends 




MSC to operate their ships, they cannot compare costs across providers or rely on the 
market to keep the prices fair due to a lack of procedural and decision-making visibility 
on the part of MSC (Whatley, 1996).   
C.   EARLY HISTORY OF THE MARITIME SUPPORT VESSEL (MSV) 
Long before the JSOTF–P requirement for a dedicated MSV, a variety of ships 
were used to support MIW operations in the Philippines.  After 9/11, SOCOM negotiated 
between the Army and the Navy for the last two years of a five-year split lease of the 
High Speed Vessel (HSV) X-1 Joint Venture to evaluate its ability to perform specific 
mission scenarios and limited operational experiments, in order to assess the vessel’s 
usefulness in U.S. Military applications.  Essentially a high-speed catamaran originally 
designed as a ferry, the HSV was modified for military purposes.  SOCOM utilized the 
HSV in many areas of the world, including the Philippines, during this time and even 
served as part of the invasion force for Operation Iraqi Freedom by speeding into the 
shallow Persian Gulf.  Use of the vessel was discontinued when its lease expired after 
two years. There were no other high-speed catamarans commercially available to replace 
the HSV when its lease expired.  All other catamarans with suitable configurations or 
capabilities were either already under charter or not available in a timely manner 
(Military Sealift Command, 2009).  Figure 6 identifies the HSV-X1 Joint Venture. 
 
 
Figure 6.   HSV-X1 Joint Venture (From: Military Sealift Command, 2010) 
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Also in 2001, the Military Sealift Command commissioned the USNS GySgt Fred 
W. Stockham (T-AK 3017) as part of the Maritime Prepositioning Force.  The Stockham 
was configured to strategically position supplies for the U.S. Marine Corps at sea and was 
laden with a variety of equipment and supplies, including tanks, ammunition, food, 
hospital equipment, petroleum products, and spare parts all ready for rapid delivery 
ashore when needed (Military Sealift Command, 2009).  As part of a five-year lease 
starting in 2003, the Stockham was also available for limited operations in the 
Philippines. Figure 7 identifies the USNS Stockham. 
 
 
Figure 7.   USNS Fred W. Stockham (T-AK 3017) (From: Military Sealift Command, 
2010) 
Many other gray-hull warships in the region were utilized as vessels of 
opportunity when these leased vessels were not available.  Of the different ships 
available, none of them met all of the requirements on a consistent basis.  The HSV’s 
speed and radical design did not lend itself to the long days of loitering required for “be 
prepared for” missions.  The Stockham had size and the ability to loiter but also had the 
possibility of being called away on a prepositioning mission on a moment’s notice.  The 
gray-hull warships’ availability was even more tenuous due to other taskings. 
By 2005, there was no obvious ship in the current DoD inventory that could meet 
SOCOM’s requirements for supporting a dedicated maritime irregular warfare effort.  
Once the requirement for a MSV was established, the focus shifted to how to properly 
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meet that requirement by using existing platforms in service, by procuring a vessel 
through the PPBE acquisition process, or by leasing or purchasing an appropriate vessel 
from a commercial source. 
While the U.S. military has a number of ships capable of performing the required 
mission, the political environment of the Philippines did not support U.S. warships 
patrolling the coast on a regular basis (England, 2008).  This political limitation 
hampered the use of commissioned ships to serve in this capacity, as it may have actually 
hindered the efforts of the U.S. by discrediting the Philippine government and becoming 
a magnet for insurgent propaganda.  
D.   MSV PROGRAM STRATEGY 
From its inception, the employment of the MSV was described as a ship to 
support, launch and recover, refuel and rearm, and provide limited maintenance to 
various-sized craft, both organic and non-organic. However, it was mainly envisioned to 
support the Naval Special Warfare (NSW) 11-meter Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) 
and the MKV Special Operations Craft (SOC). 
Operated by a three-person crew, the 11-meter RHIB is designed for the insertion 
and extraction of SEAL Team personnel.  It is a twin-turbocharged diesel engine, 
waterjet-propelled personnel carrier with a fiber-reinforced plastic (FRP) hull and an 
inflatable sponson capable of speeds of up to 48 knots.  
The MKV SOC is a high-speed (50+ knots (kts)), medium-range SOF insertion 
and extraction craft with a shallow draft, 500+ nautical-mile range that can carry a fully 
equipped SEAL Platoon (16 operators).  It has a twin diesel engine powered by water jet 
drives.  The MKV also has an enhanced communications suite and can be outfitted with 
eight .50 caliber machine guns and combinations of grenade launchers.  Figure 8 




Figure 8.   NSW 11M RHIB and MKV SOC (From: U.S. Navy, 2010) 
Additionally, the ship would need to provide berthing and habitability for the 
ship’s crew and 30 additional personnel for at least 30 days without resupply.  The vessel 
should also be capable of storing ordnance, specialized communications equipments, and 
approximately 8,000 gallons of motor gasoline (MOGAS) and have the ability to refuel 
small boats on deck and in the water. 
Although the MSV’s operating area was designated as the Southeast Asian 
littorals, there was a desire for this vessel to operate in a wide range of areas around the 
globe.  The ship would be in full operating status throughout the charter period with 
extended at-sea deployments and should be able to enter austere ports and provide its 
own ship’s services without external assistance.  The vessel was also required to have a 
minimum endurance of 30 days at sea to include on-station loitering to support personnel 
and boats.  A minimum range of 10,000 nautical miles with at least 12 kts speed was also 
desired.  The requirement for at least 12 kts demonstrates the importance of loitering for 
long periods rather than a need for traveling to different areas at high speeds.  
Though the desired vessel to support MIW was described in many ways,1 from a 
requirements standpoint, it needed to fulfill four critical missions. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Some stakeholders characterized the MSV requirement as “a mother ship for NSW combatant craft” 
or as a ship “designed to transport personnel, equipment and supplies to remote locations that cannot be 
reached with larger vessels” or even as “a floating 7-11” or “a floating Motel 6.”  
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• Afloat Forward Staging Base (allowing personnel to live onboard) 
• Maritime mobility (moving things and people around) 
• Small-boat re-fueling (extending boat range) 
• Theater Security Cooperation Planning (helping other nations) 
Fulfilling these critical missions in a MIW sense involved supporting the launch, 
recovery and staging of AFP boats in order to enhance the ability to support the 
Philippine counterinsurgency campaign.  NSW’s primary mission of OEF–P was to 
promote and assist in capacity building of the AFP by operating alongside its Philippine 
counterparts, such as the Philippine Naval Special Operations Unit (NAVSOU), which 
includes Philippine SEALs, through training and operations conducted onboard and on 
vessels previously operating in the area.2   
E. MSV PROGRAM EXECUTION 
The acquisition process for the MSV consisted of three distinct, but overlapping, 
phases. 
• Acquisition of Funding Phase (February 2006 to February 2007) 
• Requirements Phase  (December 2006 to May 2007) 
• Construction Phase  (May 2007 to November 2007) 
1.   Acquisition of Funding Phase 
In February 2006, SOCPAC issued a Statement of Requirement to SOCOM for “a 
SOF AFSB and mother craft for NSW combatant craft (NAVSPECWARCOM, 2008).”  
In May 2006, PACOM sent a Request for Forces (RFF) to the Joint Staff for “a vessel 
with an innocuous appearance, similar to an ocean going tug (NAVSPECWARCOM, 
2008).”   
                                                 
2 In the early months of 2010, the Philippines NAVSOU purchased four 11-meter RHIBs  to help 
combat the maritime terrorist and other illegal activities conducted in the vast waterways of the Philippines.  
As part of OEF–P, U.S. Navy Special Warfare Combatant Crewman and SEALs conducted a six-week 
class to train their AFP counterparts on basic craft operation, maintenance and navigation as wells as on 
conducting tactical employment training from the RHIBs.  This training was conducted from the current 
MSV, the C-Champion utilized by NSW in support of OEF–P and JSOTF–P operations (JSOTF–P PAO, 
2009). 
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Naval Special Warfare Command N3/5 routed an Operations and Maintenance 
(O&M) and an Investment Unfunded Requirements (UFR) request in June for “Total 
[cost] = $9.5M per year (modifications not included).”  However, the Joint Staff and Joint 
Forces were unable to fund the request, and they recommended sending it to the Navy 
and SOCOM.  PACOM immediately sent the request to SOCOM and the CNO “in order 
to maintain a discrete signature and access to ports (NAVSPECWARCOM, 2008).”  
In January 2007, OPNAV approved $7 million FY07 funds and OSD directed that 
$10 million per year be provided from PACOM to the Joint Staff until 2012.  After 
funding was secured, PACOM officially endorsed the SOCPAC MSV requirement on 
February 1, 2007.  
2.   Requirements Phase 
The Requirements Phase began in December 2006 with the first list of 
requirements agreed upon by the MSV Working Group, consisting of SOCPAC and 
various Naval Special Warfare units.  Once the initial requirements were established, the 
MSC Charter Requirements Questionnaire (1st draft) was completed and submitted to 
MSC in January 2007, along with a spreadsheet delineating each unit’s position regarding 
each requirement. 
Once MSC received the questionnaire, it then issued a Market Survey in January 
in order to gather information on which companies had vessels that could fulfill the 
requirements.  Results from the survey showed that no ships would be available until July 
or August of that year.  Based on the gathered information, MSC called for lowest 
price/technically acceptable bidding instead of best value, which significantly shortened 
the bidding process to only five months compared to the average of 11 to 18 months.  
MSC also completed a draft Statement of Work that was reviewed by NSWC N-85 and 
SOCPAC to ensure that both concurred with the wording of the document.   
After posting a RFP on their website, MSC began the Technical Review process 
of all written proposals followed by oral presentations by the bidding companies at MSC 
in March.  These oral presentations were an innovation that MSC coordinated in order to 
facilitate shortening the period companies had to draft their proposals.  Technical 
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Evaluations of all Best and Final Offers (BAFOs) were conducted at MSC in April. 
Seven different companies proposed a total of eight different ships, though only four 
ships were considered technically acceptable.  The lowest bidder was selected. A Pre-
award Survey of the Edison Chouest vessel C-Courageous was conducted by the end of 
the month, with a Charter Award finally being presented to Edison Chouest Offshore 
(ECO) on May 10, 2007, for a period of time totaling four years and 11 months, allowing 
for an extra 30 days to renegotiate the contract before breaking the five-year limit. 
The Navy has had extensive experience dealing with ECO and has used different 
types of lease arrangements to acquire the specialized support services of vessels owned 
and operated by ECO (Wiggins, 1999).  The Chouest vessels have generally been leased 
on a short-term basis—less than five years—for transportation services, fleet tug services, 
and special missions, such as oceanographic surveillance and research. Under these 
leases, the Navy pays for the services of the vessel, its crew, and its operations and 
maintenance (O&M) on a daily use basis.  Since 1969, the DoD has required its 
components to perform economic analyses of lease-versus-purchase decisions.  Lease-
versus-purchase analyses are not required for short-term lease arrangements (Wiggins, 
1999).  
3.  Construction Phase 
Within days of signing the contract, ECO had to swap vessels due to the extension 
of C-Courageous’ prior contract.  The new ship, C-Champion, was of similar design as 
the C-Courageous and was determined to not adversely affect the contracted 
requirements.  The 220-foot long, 56-foot wide vessel boasted a 16-foot beam and a 
working deck of about 3,640 square feet.  C-Champion had previously been in 
international service for PEMEX, the Mexican national oil company, and therefore had 
already been upgraded to meet more stringent International Convention for Safety of Life 




The C-Champion would be modified for use at ECO’s North American 
Shipbuilding (NAS) in Larose, Louisiana, which designs and constructs vessels only for 
ECO and affiliated companies.  NSWC N85 Maritime Surface Programs coordinated 
extensively with ECO NSA throughout the construction phase to ensure the 
modifications were in accordance with contracted requirements and standards.   
C-Champion was expected to be in the shipyard by the beginning of June to begin 
Operations and Habitability Modification fabrication but was delayed and did not arrive 
until the end of the month.  Some of the bigger modifications included a water maker, an 
alarm system, a crane system, and a berthing compartment to house the 30 service 
members required for operational purposes.  A 7-meter Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
(RHIB) was also purchased to facilitate the administrative transits from the vessel to 
shore that was anticipated to happen once the ship was in the area of operations.   
While the ship was being modified for service, the C-Champion’s crew—12 
civilian mariners—began the necessary training in preparation for the mission they would 
begin once in the area of operations.  This training included weapons proficiency, force 
protection drills, and small craft launch and recovery.  Before the American Bureau of 
Shipping (ABS)/Coast Guard inspection in late August, issues with the ship’s crane 
became apparent.  The ship’s crane was not rated for personnel as was required by the 
contract and therefore did not meet mission requirements.  Once the crane was 
determined to be not man-rated, an alternative system was tested in which empty 11-
meter RHIBs were moved to a man-rated davit via an extremely large single-point 
shackle.  This procedure induced considerable instability when lifting the craft as high as 
was required in order to clear fixed deck equipment and also involved various awkward 
movements and momentary disconnections, resulting in much longer launch times.  It 
was determined that the proper requirement should have called for a “launch device” vice 
specifically requiring a crane, which would have allowed for other launching mechanisms 
to be considered.  MSC admitted that it should have involved its technical experts, such 
as MSC engineers, to evaluate the technical requirements to launch and recover boats.  
This may have prevented the improper ordering of the crane.  It was later decided by the  
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end users that a system of four davits would accomplish this critical mission requirement.  
Once the davit system was assembled, launch-and-recovery testing resumed with final 
construction, testing and delivery completed in early December.   
As with any program, there are many coordination and expectation management 
issues associated with satisfying all concerned parties with a vested interest in the 
contract.  However, considering that the decision-making process involved five different 
organizations working in five different time zones—Contract Officer at MSC in 
Washington DC, Construction at the shipyard in Louisiana, Requirement consolidation 
by NSW in San Diego, Requirement and spending approval by SOCPAC in Hawaii, and 
the ultimate end user at NSWU-1 in Guam—the final product was well received by all.3  
Figure 9 identifies the MV C-Champion operating in vicinity of the Philippines.  
 
 
Figure 9.   C-Champion (From: NAVSPECWARCOM, 2009) 
                                                 
3 One SOCPAC staff member’s observations concisely described how most felt upon initially viewing 
the vessel: “blown away by how great the MSV package looks […] so clean and orderly you could eat off 
the deck.  The facilities, crew accommodations, communications suite, etc were all first class. […] It’s up 
to them now to fully utilize the platform.”   
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F.  MSV BUDGET AND FINANCE 
The modifications to the C-Champion totaled approximately $7 million. The 
MSV’s budget for FY08–10 is just over $10 million per year.  To facilitate increased 
management of the funds and to deal with other administrative and miscellaneous issues, 
such as mid-year UFRs, NAVSPECWARCOM automatically taxes this amount 5%.  
From the remaining amount (approximately $9.099 million), fuel, food, berthing, port 
costs, travel, and various miscellaneous costs incurred throughout the year are subtracted.  
In accordance with the charter contract, the daily rate for the ship and crew is 
approximately $18,000.   
MSC also taxes the amount remaining following the WARCOM taxes for the 
year, although this percentage has decreased over the years from 7% in FY08 to 4% in 
FY10.  This tax applies to the daily rate, fuel, food, and other miscellaneous expenses 
paid through MSC. Figure 10 depicts the requirements generation and the financial 




Figure 10.   MSV Requirements and Financial Process (From: NAVSPECWARCOM, 
2009) 
G. LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 
As mentioned previously, the MSV’s crew consists of 12 civilian contractors 
employed by ECO.  Since the vessel maintains a persistent presence in the area of 
operations, members of the crew are swapped out every few months.  Also, there is a 
MSV Officer in Charge (OIC/Navy O-3) and a MSV Senior Enlisted Advisor (SEA/Navy 
E-7), who are Individual Augmentees provided by PACFLT and are responsible for 
coordinating logistical and operational support between the MSV’s crew and embarked 
service members.  The OIC and SEA are also responsible for proper liaison between the 
various levels of the chain of command.  There is also an SOF-experienced 
communicator provided by SOCPAC onboard. 
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On average, the MSV remains underway for 25 days and in port for five days.  
The MSV consumes on average about 4,000 DFM gallons per day while transiting at 10 
to 12 knots, 2,000 DFM gallons per day loitering, and 300 DFM gallons per day in port.  
While in port, the MSV crew conducts the necessary preventive and involved 
maintenance that they are unable to perform while underway.   
One source of frustration for MSC revolved around the issue of force protection 
as stated in a letter to NSW from the PM2 program office: 
From an operational command and control perspective, the MSV presents 
some challenges to us.  MSC usually relies on our local area commanders 
to maintain situational awareness of our forward deployed 
ships…Although we respect your need to maintain operational security for 
the missions, MSC must be afforded some level of visibility of ship 
location and force protection posture…In addition to using the information 
that is available through secure web sites, I would like to have MSC staff 
maintain more frequent contact with their SPECWAR counterparts. 
(NAVSPECWARCOM, 2009) 
At the core of this issue is the need to maintain the operational security of a vessel 
working in an irregular manner not typical of MSC ships.  As a SOCOM asset, the MSV 
is outside the Seventh Fleet and Military Sealift Command, South East Asia chain of 
command that applies to every other MSC ship in the Pacific.  With the SOCPAC 
Commander as the approving force protection authority in the chain of command, the 
measures taken to ensure vessel and crew safety do not normally make it back to MSC.  
Especially problematic is that the MSV operates with blanket clearances to enter coastal 
waters, and ECO arranges port visits like a commercial ship so that prior notification 
rules are very different.  These procedures allow the MSV to enter a port with more 
assurances that its presence is not anticipated and perhaps even exploited by some 
unfriendly elements of the population. MSC has come to accept these procedures, even if 





Figure 11.   MSV Operational Chain of Command (From: NAVSPECWARCOM, 
2009) 
H.  KEY FACTORS AND TRADE-OFFS 
There are some key factors and trade-offs that need to be addressed in regard to 
both the important but less than apparent characteristics of the MSV  and to the obviously 
lacking but perhaps not as determinant capabilities of the vessel. 
The use of civilian mariners onboard vessels used for irregular purposes brings 
with it a more flexibility than the use of military service members.  It is arguable whether 
civilian mariners are more capable than their military counterparts, but with regards to 
transiting through and working within foreign ports, civilian mariners are less likely to 
raise suspicions about the intentions of the vessels they work on compared to U.S. sailors 
working onboard a similar type vessel.  Civilian mariners working on commercial vessels 
tend to blend in better with the local population and are more familiar with coordinating 
with husbanding agents to facilitate services and supplies when visiting a foreign port.  
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Civilian mariners are also not restricted by the same rules that U.S. service members are 
required to follow when visiting foreign ports.  This is an attractive element when it 
comes to the use of chartered crews to support missions that require a ship and its crew to 
more or less hide in plain sight.   
Another element of the MSV that may have a surprising impact on the MIW 
mission, and that is a direct consequence of the ship itself, is the ship’s paint scheme.  
The color of the MSV is bright orange—or more appropriately Chouest Orange, a color 
that no company besides ECO uses and therefore does not carry with it the normal 
associations that a U.S. warship does.  All countries across the globe associate gray-
hulled ships with U.S. warships.4   
There are some capabilities that are lacking from the MSV, such as the ability to 
launch and recover UAVs and helicopters.  These capabilities are very important and 
would be expected to be essential requirements that should have been included in the 
original requirements list. These capabilities would have driven up costs significantly and 
may have also delayed the delivery date of the vessel.  While these are limitations of the 
current MSV, there is debate between the MSV stakeholders about whether or not to 
expand the requirements to include both of these capabilities in future MSV platforms 
because it may actually entail a fundamental shift in mission away from primarily 
supporting boat operations. 
                                                 
4 One MSC official offered up a scenario based on a personal experience in which he was standing on 
a pier in a foreign port looking out to sea, watching as a few U.S.-flagged vessels were anchoring off of the 
coast.  All of the ships were leased vessels, and this official had been involved with each of the ships’ 
contracts.  Of the ships that were there, one was painted in a black and white scheme and was carrying very 
sensitive material onboard.  The other was a grey-hulled prepositioning ship that was only carrying 
equipment, vehicles, and rations to support ground forces in case of major conflicts.  A local person walked 
up to him and asked all about the grey-hulled ship, completely overlooking the black and white vessel 
carrying the more sensitive and more interesting cargo.  This illustration only serves to demonstrate how 
something so simple as the color of a ship may actually have the most influence over the local population.  
If it looks like a U.S. warship, then, no matter what its mission really is, it will be thought of as a warship. 
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VI.  VESSEL REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES 
A.  NEED 
As national security objectives continue to project abroad, one of the biggest 
challenges facing the Department of Defense (DoD) is the dilemma of obtaining and 
maintaining forward bases.  SOF is at the forefront of these objectives, and the need to 
maintain operational flexibility to counter political anti-access and irregular warfare 
challenges require some sort of Afloat Forward Staging Base (AFSB) to provide flexible 
and sustainable locations from which to operate.  While it is true that any of our 
combative vessels offers overwhelming firepower dominance over most of our 
adversaries, political sensitivity does not allow for their presence (Corpening, Hurry & 
Young, 2006). 
An AFSB is not necessarily the end-all be-all solution to the anti-access 
challenge, but it is important to understand the weight of its role.  Having a staging vessel 
at sea clearly benefits all joint forces.  Maneuver space and sovereignty of the seas can be 
exploited; enabling combatant commanders enhanced operational flexibility and 
effectiveness, as well as increased safety and protection from land-based enemy forces.  
When establishing a shore base, the enemy knows from where power is going to be 
projected.  With an AFSB, such as the current Maritime Support Vessel, the enemy is 
constantly guessing (Corpening, Hurry & Young, 2006). 
B.  OPERATIONAL MISSIONS 
To generate requirements for a MSV, the operational missions this vessel would 
be involved with first had to be examined.  First and foremost, the MSV was going to 
serve as an AFSB with SOF living onboard. It would offer maritime mobility and move 
equipment and people around.  It had to have the capability to offer small-boat refueling, 
thereby extending visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) range.  The vessel needed to 
serve as a platform for Theater Security Cooperation Planning, rendering aid to other 
nations, and fulfill the role of Liaison Coordination Element Logistics Support in support 
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of small detachments ashore.  The requested MSV had to aid in operational preparation 
of the given environment, serve as a potential Maritime Craft Air Delivery System 
(MCADS) recovery platform, and act as a potential Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and dive 
support platform (NAVSPECWARCOM, 2010).  
1.  Requirements 
The requirements sent to MSC for a commercial vessel to be used by the U.S. 
military in the South-East Asian (SEA) littorals were a conglomeration of positions 
generated by NAVSPECWARCOM, SOCPAC, and NSWG-4.  These entities then came 
to a consensus, and the requirements were sent to MSC for action.  These requirements 
will be further explored to illustrate how the current MSV came to be. 
According to NAVSPECWARCOM, and as previously described, to conduct 
operations in support of JSOTF–P, SOF required “a mother ship for NSW combatant 
craft designed to transport personnel, equipment and supplies to remote locations that 
cannot be reached with larger vessels” (NAVSPECWARCOM, 2009).  This vessel 
needed to act as a maritime mother craft, supporting various organic and non-organic 
maritime assets.  It had to be a maritime surface support platform to launch and recover, 
refuel, rearm, and provide maintenance for small boats.  Furthermore, the MSV needed to 
provide berthing and habitability for the ship’s civilian crew and at least 30 military 
personnel for 30 days without resupply.  Ordnance, Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM), MOGAS, 
and specialized communication equipment were required to be stored as well.  The vessel 
had to have an endurance of a minimum of 30 days at sea, to include 20 days on station 
supporting personnel and boats, with a range of at least 10,000 nautical miles (nm) at a 
speed of 12 kts. 
2.  Resulting MSV Capabilities 
As we have said, the result of this inquiry was an orange-hulled, white-
superstructure, modified ocean-going tugboat built by Edison Chouest, known as the C-








Engineering (3) Diesel Catapillar Z-drives; 1 FWD, 2 AFT
Cargo
Embark up to 4 NSW 11-meter RHIBs or 
similar craft, 4 boat davits, 15-ton crane + open 
deck with 4 weapons/ammo boxes
Speed 10 kts
Crew Size 30 SOF / 12 Civ Crew
Fuel Capacity 65,000 gal DFM/2,200 gal MOGAS
Endurance (20 % 
Reserve)





1 Corpsman; Medical Space (240X114);  2 
tables, Deep sink
Communications 
Suite UHF, VHF, SAT Comms, Tactical Comms
    Armament




Figure 12.   MV C-Champion (From: NAVSPECWARCOM, 2009) 
Another modification to the C-Champion is the addition of an 
operations/habitability module.  This two-level module placed on the main deck of the 
MSV offers a multitude of facilities. The main level includes a medical space, a machine  
 
 64
shop, and seven two-man staterooms. The 01 level includes a lounge/briefing room, 
communication space, planning space, office space, and an exercise room.  This module 
can be modified to suite operational needs (NAVSPECWARCOM, 2009). 
C.  WARGAMING SCENARIO 
To further aid in the analysis of vessel capabilities, the OA4604 Wargaming 
Applications Course within the Operations Research curriculum of the Graduate School 
of Operations and Information Sciences (GSOIS) at the Naval Postgraduate School 
assisted the MBA-project team in constructing a wargame scenario.  The MBA-project 
team selected three candidate ships to be used in a scenario taking place in the Philippine 
Islands.  The intent of the wargame and analysis was to compare and contrast the 
capabilities of the three candidate ships and their ability to successfully complete 
anticipated missions in the Philippines.  The candidate ships were the Edison Chouest C-
Champion (current MSV); the Joint Venture High-speed Vessel (HSV), which conducted 
operations in the Philippine Islands in the early part of the decade; and the Littoral 
Combat Ship USS FREEDOM (LCS-1), which will potentially be operating in the 
littorals of Southeast Asia.  Figure 13 identifies the three ships with their general 
capabilities as utilized in the wargame. 
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MV C-CHAMPION HSV-2 SWIFT LCS-1 USS FREEDOM
Speed: 12 knots 35 knots 45 knots
Length: 220 feet 331 feet, 4 inches 379 feet
Beam: 56 feet 87 feet, 5 inches 43 feet
Draft: 16.5 feet 11 feet 12.8 feet
Displacement: 2,106 tons 1,463.6 tons 3,089 tons
Civilian Crew: 14 contract mariners 17 contract mariners 0 contract mariners
Military Crew: None Mil crew as needed 40
Weapons:
2 x .50 cal 1 x 25mm, 2 x .50 cal, 
2 x MK-19
1 x 57mm, 4 x .50 cal, RAM
Endurance: 13 days / 10kts 1 day  /  35kts 1 day / 45kts
26 days / 5kts 6 days / 20kts 7 days / 20kts
Helicopters: No Air Assets Helo Pad 2 x MH-60Rs
Small Boat Capacity: 4 x 11m RHIBs 2 x 11m RHIBs 2 x 11m RHIBs
Owned / Chartered: Chartered Chartered Owned  
Figure 13.   Wargame Scenario Ships (From: Military Sealift Command, 2010 and 
PEO Ships, 2009) 
1.  Wargame Description 
The exercise was an Open-seminar wargame set in the Philippine Islands 
adjudicated and run by a moderator assisted by team members.  The game board was a 
Google Earth display that included custom game-piece icons.  The fuel gauge was an 
Excel program that calculated fuel burn and displayed the remaining-fuel level. 
The scenarios for the three vessels were focused on supporting humanitarian and 
SOF operations relevant to what may be similar to a real-world situation in that region.  
Each vessel was run through four vignettes: 
• Vignette 1: Support rescue operations of 400 victims and medical 
evacuation of three urgent surgical victims from a capsized ferry 
(humanitarian). 
• Vignette 2: Transit to support insertion of SOF assets in response to a 




• Vignette 3: Conduct noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) of 12 
American citizens (AMCITs) (SOF support).  
• Vignette 4: Defend against a coordinated speedboat attack (self-defense). 
These vignettes were designed to evaluate (a) the ship’s ability to accomplish designated 
missions (organic and inorganic asset utilization), (b) logistics requirements and 
limitations (fuel usage and duration at sea), and (c) time to arrive on scene and complete 
evolutions.  The ship captains during the scenarios for the HSV and MSV were retired 
U.S. Navy commanding officers, while the captain for the LCS was a former navigator 
for LCS-1. 
a.  Vignette 1:  Humanitarian Assistance 
In the first vignette, a ferry capsized near the island of Romblon.  The 
vessel was 50 nautical miles away, and the ship’s support was needed as soon as possible 
to recover 400 personnel as quickly as possible.  The respective ship’s captain needed to 
utilize assets (e.g., RHIBs, MH-60R, MK V, etc., if available) to recover personnel as 
quickly as possible.  Each captain was presented with medical casualties from the 
capsizing and needed to provide medical support and transport casualties to proper 
facilities. 
b.  Vignette 2:  SOF Support (Security Operations) 
In the second vignette, there was an improvised explosive device (IED) 
attack on a government building on Negros Island.  The vessel was 125 nautical miles 
away, and SOF support was needed as soon as possible.  There was a medical casualty in 
this vignette that needed to be evacuated, so the responding vessel had to provide medical 




c.  Vignette 3:  SOF Support (NEO) 
In this vignette, there was an increased hostility on the island of Negros 
that resulted in the need to evacuate American citizens from the embassy.  The mission 
for the SOF was to evacuate 12 American citizens (AMCITs) from the island of Negros, 
which was 100 nautical miles from the vessel’s location.  
d.  Vignette 4:  Small-Boat Attack 
During the final vignette, the MSV was 20 nautical miles away from the 
port of Cebu, heading inbound, when three small boats began harassing the vessel.  The 
ship’s captain had to utilize whatever assets and capabilities available in order to defend 
the ship against the small-boat attack. 
2.  Assumptions, Constraints and Limitations 
For the sake of the wargame, certain assumptions were put into effect. 
• Fuel-burn rates for each ship 
• Favorable weather 
• U.S. assets available 
• Special Operations Boat 
• MARK V  
• Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
• MH-60R 
• Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) 
• Raven 
• Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIB) 
• Capacity: 11 passengers (PAX) plus crew 
There were stipulations within the exercise.  Vessels were required to return to 
base whenever their respective fuel level was near or below 20% of the total fuel 
capacity.  There was only one possible logistic/services port (Cebu), and follow-on 
vignettes could not be executed with extra civilians onboard (from Vignette 1). 
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3.  Scenario Results 
The grounds for judging the most capable platform were based on mission-
completion time, scenario-completion time, average speed, and fuel consumption.  The 
LCS was considered the most capable ship for the vignettes encountered due to its 
embarked helicopter detachment, as well as its defensive capabilities and ability to deal 
with unforeseen emergencies (mainly because of the embarked helicopter detachment and 
its speed).  The HSV was considered to be capable because of its speed and flight deck. 
However, utilization of the flight deck is still dependent upon external assets; in the 
simulation, the needed asset was available but it was two hours away.  Furthermore, the 
high rate of fuel consumption of the HSV and its limited defensive measures were 
considered to be capability gaps for this platform.  Finally, the C-Champion was seen as 
being severely limited in its ability to deal with unforeseen emergencies due to its slow 
speed and dependency on external assets.  Yet, it stole the show in terms of fuel 
consumption—6,713 total gallons compared to 245,609 total gallons and 41,919 total 
gallons by the HSV and LCS, respectively. 
D.  CONCLUSIONS 
Benefits of an Afloat Forward Staging Base were discussed earlier, but there are 
two distinct advantages of leasing a civilian vessel with a contracted civilian crew, as is 
the case with the C-Champion: 
• The nature of the ship’s operation 
• The nature of the crew 
Commercial ships are totally innocuous. That is, they are unlikely to arouse any strong 
feelings or hostility.  This is primarily due to their appearance.  With normal commercial 
colors, the local population does not bat an eye at the presence of an MSV slowly making 
its way along the coastline.  This ability to operate amongst the local population without 
drawing undesirable attention gives the government plausible deniability that any outside 
assistance is being rendered, and it allows the SOF embarked to inconspicuously 
complete their missions. 
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The nature of the crew also offers many advantages for SOF.  The civilian crews 
are typically much more experienced than military crews, and although they may stand 
out in a foreign port, they still look like ordinary merchant seamen.  Furthermore, civilian 
crews under contract allow for a much longer time on station and do not require as 
stringent a force-protection package.  While SOF personnel are constantly being rotated 
out on their regular deployment cycles, civilian crews on a “civilian” ship can spend a 
nearly unlimited time on station, thus ensuring the presence and availability of the MSV 
for various SOF elements in the region.  Also, because the MSV is technically a non-
combatant, it does not need diplomatic clearance to enter port for food, fuel, and other 
supplies, whereas a warship does require diplomatic clearance, possibly drawing negative 
attention. 
The fact that the vessel is leased also offers an advantage.  If there is a leak in 
operational security and the vessel is found to be an instrument of will, the ship contract 
can be terminated quickly.  This allows for another MSV to be leased and brought onto 
station for continued operations in support of SOF. 
The current MSV is not without its flaws.  Being that it is a non-
combative, it cannot enter a specific objective area.  This means that it has 
no ability to assist SOF with long-range weapons.  It does have two .50 
caliber gun mounts, but it must rely primarily on the embarked SOF and 
any available MK Vs for any real force protection when underway.  Also, 
the current MSV has no intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance (ISR) 
capability, which is typically paramount in any SOF operation. (S. 
Armstrong, personal communication, March 5, 2010) 
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VII. COST VS. CAPABILITIES TRADEOFFS 
Given a set of capabilities for each vessel type under analysis, we now calculate a 
cost per day of putting those capabilities on station at any given time.  Evaluating each 
vessel on a cost-per-day basis provides decision-makers with a concrete assessment of the 
costs of deploying a specific capability for a given mission and further simplifies 
determining what those costs are over anticipated mission duration. 
For each vessel, we have collected data on the capital costs (such as acquisition 
and procurement) or lease costs, as well as the operating and support costs. The cost data 
collected for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was taken from reports by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and is based upon U.S. Navy cost estimates. Costs for the Maritime Support 
Vessel (MSV) C-Champion were collected from actual budget-and-spending documents 
at NAVSPECWARCOM. Costs for the High Speed Vessel (HSV) were obtained through 
conversations and correspondence with the Military Sealift Command (MSC) and are 
based upon actual costs in a previous lease contract for the HSV-2 Swift.   
Table 1 shows the cost breakdown for the LCS in millions of dollars based upon 
estimates by the U.S. Navy and analyzed by either the CRS or the GAO.  Estimated costs 
for the LCS have increased significantly over time. The original LCS cost cap of $220 
million per vessel5 has since grown to $480 million per vessel for vessels procured 
beyond 2010 (O’Rourke, 2009).  
 
Table 1.   LCS Unit, Operating and Support Costs 
LCS-1 Cost
Unit cost $480,000,000
Operating and Support Costs per year $61,700,000
Cost per day $221,644  
                                                 
5 The original cost cap of $220 million per vessel was established in the FY2006 Defense 
Authorization Act (H.R. 1815/P.L. 109-163 of January 6, 2006). See O’Rourke (2009) for further 
discussion. 
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The U.S. Navy estimate of $480 million per unit for the LCS-1 assumes a 25-year 
service life for the sea-frame and a 30-year service life for each of the four planned 
mission modules (the mine-warfare module, the antisubmarine warfare module, the 
surface-warfare module, and the maritime-security module). The $61.7 million per year 
in operating costs per vessel is an estimate that includes the cost to operate and support a 
mix of the two sea-frames plus one year of mission module cost (GAO, 2010).6  The sea-
frame portion of the operating and support costs includes unit-level manpower, unit 
operations, maintenance, sustainment and support, system improvement, C4I, and 
disposal. The mission module portion of the operating and support costs includes food 
and berthing, maintenance and repair, personnel, training, fuel, supplies, expendables, 
hardware, and engineering and technical support.  While the $61.7 million estimate for 
operating and support costs may seem high for the LCS-1, it should be noted that these 
are estimates and that estimates for the LCS have tended to increase (rather than 
decrease) greatly over time. Therefore, these costs may represent close to a lower bound. 
To calculate the cost per day to deploy the LCS-1 for a maritime irregular-warfare 
mission, we take the estimated cost per vessel of $480 million and divide it over the 25-
year planned lifecycle, which gives a cost of $19.2 million per year. Next, we add the 
$61.7 million per year operating and support costs and divide the sum by 365 days, which 
gives us ($19.2M + $61.7M) ÷ 365 = $222,000 per day.  
The HSV-2 Swift is a leased vessel that is currently operating as a Global Fleet 
Station Ship. The lease was for one year with three one-year options. The daily rate for 
the HSV-2 Swift was $50,000,7 and we have estimated the annual lease cost based upon 
this daily rate to be $18.250 million ($50,000 × 365 days = $18,250,000). The food and 
berthing costs for the HSV-2 Swift were $30 per day for the 20-person military 
detachment and we have estimated the total annual food and berthing costs (excluding the 
food and berthing costs for the civilian crew, which are already captured in the daily rate) 
                                                 
6 The one year of mission-module cost is a composite cost of each of the four planned mission 
modules. It includes a portion of the cost for each mission module. In 2008, the GAO reported the program 
unit cost of the surface warfare modules as $27.047 million, the anti-submarine warfare module as $57.046 
million, and the mine countermeasures module as $40.665 million. No estimates were given for the 
maritime security module (GAO, 2008). 
7 The daily rate includes costs of maintenance, repair, and civilian contracted crew.  
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to be $219,000 ($30 × 20 (person MilDet) × 365 days = $219,000). The fuel costs 
associated with both the LCS-1 and the HSV-2 can vary widely depending upon the 
number of days the vessel is at a particular speed. To estimate the fuel costs, we used fuel 
curves provided by the Military Sealift Command (see Table 2) and developed an 
operating-speed profile that assumes the number of days the vessel will have its engines 
running and the speed at which the vessel will be operating.  
 
Table 2.   Fuel Consumption of HSV 
Speed bbls/day Gal/Hr Gal/Day Endurance (nm)
0 10 18 420 N/A
5 139 243 5,842 2,573
10 249 436 10,462 2,391
15 355 621 14,906 2,367
20 569 995 23,885 1,871
25 876 1,533 36,788 1,467
30 1,108 1,940 46,553 1,384
35 1,228 2,149 51,568 1,452  
 
After discussions with the representatives at the Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
who were familiar with the HSV-2 Swift, we assumed the vessel would be operating at 25 
knots or more due to the characteristics of the vessel and its propensity to induce 
seasickness in its crew when operating below this speed. Further, representatives from the 
MSC HSV program office stated that the HSV’s best transit speed is 25 knots.  These 
discussions and our wargame scenario results determined the HSV’s fuel consumption 
and operating speeds identified below in Table 3. We assumed an HSV deployed in a 
maritime irregular-warfare (MIW) environment would operate its engines 265 days per 
year and that the other 100 days would be maintenance or other engine down time, such 
as port visits. The assumed operating speed profile is given in Table 3. The HSV-2 Swift 
consumes 420 gallons per day at idle, 14,906 gallons per day at 15 knots, and 36,788 
gallons per day at 25 knots. We have assumed that an HSV deployed in a MIW  
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environment would idle less than 1% of the time and that it would operate at 15 knots 
20% of the time and at 25 knots 80% of the time. Under this operating speed profile, the 
annual fuel costs would be $26.626 million per year.8 
 
Table 3.   Fuel Costs of HSV 
Speed (knots)
Fuel consumed     
(per day in gallons)




0 420 0.00 111 $345
15 14,906 0.20 790,007 $2,449,023
25 36,788 0.80 7,799,014 $24,176,942
Total 1.00 8,589,132 $26,626,310  
 
Our estimate of the cost per day to bring a leased High-Speed Vessel (HSV) on station to 
support MIW (Table 4) is $124,000—the sum of the lease cost ($18.250 million) + the 
operating costs consisting of fuel, food and berthing ($219,000 + $26.626 million) ÷ 365 
days.  
 
Table 4.   HSV Lease, Operating and Support Costs 
HSV-2 Swift Annual Cost
Baseline Lease Costs  
Daily Rate $18,250,000
Operating and Support Costs
Food and Berthing (per year) $219,000
Fuel $26,626,000
Cost per day $123,548  
 
The C-Champion is under a one-year firm period lease with three, one-year option 
periods and one 11-month option period. The baseline costs of the lease include the daily 
rate of $18,104 (or an annual daily rate of $6.608 million), WARCOM taxes of 5% on the 
                                                 
8 The assumptions of operating speed and fuel consumption greatly impact total cost estimates. 
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total lease budget, and MSC administration costs (5% of the total lease cost).  Actual 
FY09 costs for fuel were $2.2 million, port costs were $88,000, food and berthing costs 
were $84,000, and travel costs were $216,000, resulting a total lease spend of $10.157 
million. The cost per day to deploy the C-Champion in the MIW environment is $28,000 
($7.569 million in baseline costs + $2.588 million in operating and support costs and then 
divided by 365). See Table 5. Based upon a Military Sealift Command lease-purchase 
analysis that showed a break-even of 10 years for the conversion of an existing vessel, 
and 14 years for a new vessel, as the point at which the cost to lease equaled the cost to 
purchase.  From this study, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy concluded:  
[T]he lease-purchase analysis indicates in the long term, buying a vessel to 
meet the Naval Special Warfare/Special Operations Forces requirement 
may be more economical than continuing the charters.  Further, assuming 
25 years of productive service, preliminary findings are that a conversion 
would be the most cost effective solution followed by a newly constructed 
vessel, and trailed by a continuous series of charters. (ASN Research, 
Development and Acquisition, 2009) 
The lease-purchase analysis did not consider the value of flexibility and options enjoyed 
through a lease, such as ease of termination and disposal and the flexibility to change 
vessels in order to adapt to the ever-evolving nature of counterinsurgency and irregular 
operations.  
 
Table 5.   C-Champion Lease, Operating and Support Costs 
C-Champion Annual Costs
Baseline Lease Costs (FY09)
Daily Rate $6,608,000
WARCOM Tax (5%) $512,000
MSC Administration costs (5%) $449,000
Operating and Support Costs
Fuel $2,200,000
Port Costs $88,000
Food and berthing (per year) $84,000
Travel costs $216,000
Cost per day $27,827  
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Table 6 summarizes the cost analysis of the LCS-1, the HSV-2 Swift and the C-
Champion. Calculating the cost per day to bring a particular vessel and its capabilities 
into a MIW environment allows the decision-maker to make informed choices about how 
to deploy different assets in different scenarios. The LCS-1 brings considerable ISR, 
maneuverability, and firepower to any operation relative to the HSV or C-Champion. 
However, it costs approximately $222,000 per day to do so. The HSV offers 
maneuverability and considerable capacity at a rate of approximately $124,000 per day. 
The C-Champion offers utility and economy at approximately $28,000 per day.  
 
Table 6.   Summary of Vessel Costs per Day 
LCS-1 HSV-2 Swift C-Champion
Unit cost $480,000,000
Baseline Lease Cost $18,250,000 $7,569,000
Operating and Support Costs $61,700,000 $26,845,000 $2,588,000




We have discussed earlier in this document that maritime irregular warfare is 
multidimensional and that there are identifiable activities associated with its conduct (see 
Figure 2).  Accordingly, there is no universal vessel appropriate for all MIW 
environments either from a capability or cost perspective. To illustrate this point, 
consider four hypothetical scenarios, similar to real-world areas of operation, with 
varying degrees of demand for each of the mission sets.  These scenarios are intended for 
use as an instrument for discussing vessel applicability within certain contexts that may 
share characteristics of a specific geographic region or area of operations.  Discussing 
each vessel in the context of a scenario demonstrates the types of cost and capability 
trade-offs that must be made when deciding what types of assets and resources should be 
deployed, assuming a mission duration and timeline, to achieve a desired result.  
A.   MIW SCENARIOS 
In developing the hypothetical scenarios, MIW activity areas were weighted 
based on the team members’ professional experience and knowledge gained through the 
research process for this project.  Figure 14 illustrates the distribution of the weighted 









Security Force Operations & Assistance 10% 20% 10% 20%
Civil‐Military Assistance 10% 20% 10%
Counter‐terrorism/piracy/narcotics 30% 70% 10% 50%
Building MaritimePartner Capability & Capacity 40% 60%
Intelligence, Surveillance& Reconnaissance 10% 10% 20%
 
Figure 14.   MIW Scenarios 
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1.   Scenario 1—Maritime Partnering, Capacity-Building and Counter-
Terrorism 
Scenario 1 emphasizes the building of maritime partner capability and capacity, as 
well as counter-terrorism with some degree of civil-military assistance, security force 
operations and assistance and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).  The 
primary objective in this scenario is to “win hearts and minds” in order to train host 
nation forces to combat terrorism and insurgency, as well as provide effective 
humanitarian relief and rapid response in case of a disaster, such as a typhoon or ferry 
sinking.  In this type of situation, a prolonged presence should be anticipated, and 
sustained support for forces would be required (not dissimilar from the distribution of 
activities in the Philippines as part of OEF-P).  Many vessels have the capability to 
support this mission for a short period of time but due to the extended loitering 
requirement, political sensitivity to a gray-hulled vessel being parked on the horizon of 
coastal waters, and cost associated with the extended dwell time a maritime support 
vessel, such as the M/V C-Champion might be preferable.  While sleek and swift vessels, 
such as LCS-1 and HSV can offer rapid response to a host of isolated situations within 
the scenario, their fuel consumption alone makes them cost-prohibitive.  Furthermore, 
any extended presence of a gray-hulled vessel is going to attract the attention of the local 
population.  For extended support of SOF in the region, a vessel, such as the MV C-
Champion would be preferred.  Its orange hull and white superstructure allow it to blend 
in with commercial vessels, while its slow, lethargic pace and capacious deck and 
habitability spaces offer low fuel consumption and provides a sustainable floating hotel 
for SOF.  Additionally, because of its forward, permanently deployed status, only the 
initial and periodic transoceanic costs are applicable. 
2.   Scenario 2—Counter-Piracy  
In Scenario 2, the highest level of effort is placed upon counter-terrorism, 
counter-piracy, and counter-narcotics.  SOF and conventional naval operations would 
work together to fight against state sponsors of terrorism.  From a MIW perspective, this 
would include maritime interdiction operations (MIO), which typically employ visit, 
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board, search, and seizure (VBSS) teams.  These teams may consist of SOF, conventional 
Sailors from ships’ company, or Coast Guard Law Enforcement (LE) detachments.  In 
this type of scenario, a slow, minimally-armed commercial vessel would probably be less 
than ideal, as it is basically a floating target for even primitively equipped aggressors.  
Cost would be less of a factor, as a combatant commander would want a vessel with 
combative capability.  Because of the incorporation of conventional naval operations, 
sustained SOF support would not be much of a requirement, since specific SOF boarding 
teams would probably be temporarily embarked on a combative vessel for limited periods 
of time.  A littoral combat ship or frigate could perform this mission adequately, and, 
given an assumed heated environment where pirates, terrorists or narco-traffickers are 
operating with impunity, political sensitivity to a warship off the coast would probably be 
irrelevant, as is the case in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa. 
There are myriad examples that illustrate how a warship would be the preferred 
vessel in Scenario 2.  Coalition forces are currently using warships off the east coast of 
Africa as command and control (C2) platforms as part of the region’s counter-piracy 
effort.  At the time of this project write-up, the USS Farragut (DDG 99) was serving as 
the flagship for Combined Task Force 151 (CTF-151) and encountered a situation in 
which the destroyer came to the aid of a tanker that was being pursued by pirates, 
eventually apprehending the pirates and disabling their skiff (MSNBC, 2010).  Just a day 
prior, the frigate, USS Nicholas (FFG 47), came under attack during the night by a group 
of pirates.  Supposedly, the pirates confused the lighting configuration of the frigate with 
that of a commercial vessel, only to be stunned and subdued when the vessel returned fire 
(MSNBC,  2010).  These are just two of many instances that show the advantage of 
having a gray-hulled warship in that region of the world.  However, just as the Tanker 
War example previously illustrated, the use of smaller, slow, mothership-type civilian 
vessels can be extremely effective when working in conjunction with small attack 
helicopters (AH-6 or similar) and/or combatant craft detachments (such as the MK-V).   
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3.   Scenario 3—Maritime Capacity-Building and Security Force 
Assistance 
Scenario 3 describes a context somewhat similar to those encountered in Scenario 
1.  However, in this scenario, the overarching emphasis is placed upon building maritime 
partner capability and capacity, as well as conducting civil-military operations.  In 
October 2007, U.S. Naval Forces Europe launched the African Partnership Station (APS).  
The dock landing ship USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) was deployed to the Gulf of Guinea 
to serve as a floating schoolhouse to provide “training focused on maritime domain 
awareness and law enforcement, port facilities management and security, 
seamanship/navigation, search and rescue, leadership, logistics, civil engineering, 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response” (Ploch, 2009). Different vessels (such as 
C-Champion) may serve as a platform for the African Partnership Station, but an 
amphibious warfare ship is most likely optimal, as it provides ample room for 
cooperative military training, berthing, and medical facilities.  These vessels have a 
minimal footprint onshore, and their relatively shallow draft allows them to pull into 
austere ports to perform a variety of community-relations projects.  At the time of this 
study’s publication, the USS Gunston Hall (LSD 44) was on the west coast of Africa 
fulfilling this role (Stratton, 2010).   
4.   Scenario 4—Counter-Narcotics and ISR 
In the final scenario, we consider a context in which the counter-narcotics mission 
is the primary focus.  A fast and agile vessel would be preferred to intercept the 
stereotypical drug-runner speedboats that are often portrayed in the media.  The U.S. 
Navy commonly uses frigates with U.S. Coast Guard LE detachments for this mission 
with success.  The USS Freedom has been successfully employed in this role, as well.  
Recently, the USS Freedom achieved its third drug seizure on March 11, 2010, disrupting 
a high-speed vessel and recovering 2 1/4 tons of cocaine during counter-illicit trafficking 
operations in U.S. 4th Fleet's Area of Responsibility (Navy.mil, 2010).  However, a more 
cost-effective method for counter-narcotics operations might be the employment of the 
PC-1 Cyclone Class.  These patrol craft do not have as sophisticated weapons systems as 
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frigates or littoral combat ships, but they do have the speed and firepower to get the job 
done.  LE detachments and special warfare teams can be embarked, and the PC’s shallow 
draft allows it to proceed close to the beach, should any shoreline MIW missions need to 
be fulfilled.  The RAND Corporation also conducted a study to examine the feasibility of 
using the PC-1 Class as a small ship for use in Theater Security Cooperation (TSC).  The 
PC would be given an updated propulsion system and improved C2, as well as a 
stabilized 25-mm gun.  Incorporating a mothership concept, RAND found that the PC-1 
would be rendered fully capable in TSC (Button, Blickstein, Smallman, Newton, Poole & 
Nixon, 2008) and this would likely be a more cost-effective way to conduct MIW 
operations, as anticipated in Scenario 4. 
B. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES UTILITY 
While there may be some vessels with greater capability that could accomplish a 
particular SOF mission, it is important to recognize that such a vessel may actually have a 
decreased level of SOF utility. Through discussions with members of the SOF 
community, we found that the greater the ship’s capabilities, the less it is dedicated and 
fully available to SOF and therefore the lower the ship’s SOF utility.  Figure 15 compares 
the SOF utility of a particular vessel versus the vessel’s overall capabilities, showing that 
the two are inversely proportional. This figure aligns the intensity of the political 
environment with the corresponding vessel that would be required, showing how political 




Figure 15.   SOF Utility vs. Ship Capabilities and Corresponding Political 
Environment 
In a politically heated environment in which there is little to no governing 
authority, and cost is of little concern, a gray-hulled ship with a full complement of 
warfare capabilities would be required for quick response to a crisis or conflict and to 
take the lead in combat operations.  While a combative may be able to provide support 
for SOF for a particular operation, its sustainability in a loitering role comes into 
question.  Though required for heated conflict, a vessel with multiple warfare capabilities 
will eventually be assigned other tasks to exploit those capabilities, thereby limiting its 
role in SOF support.  On the other end of the spectrum, in a calmer setting in which a 




solution offering dedicated support and sustainability is required.  In this type of scenario 
where there is not a direct need for quick, lethal, and decisive force, a platform other than 
a gray-hulled warship may be desirable. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
Global events constantly challenge the U.S. military to respond to almost any 
scenario.  Policy leaders, both military and civilian, must decide upon the nation’s 
objectives and strategies and then acquire the appropriate capabilities and platforms.  As 
the defense budget becomes more constrained, all viable options to pursue needed 
technologies or platforms should be available.  Our findings are consistent with those of 
Hughes, et al. (2009) in their description of how the Navy can develop “a more 
distributed combat capability for sea control and the projection of national influence from 
the sea” through the acquisition of smaller, single-purpose vessels (Hughes, 2009). 
Because of the cost advantage of the MV C-Champion, two or three of these vessels 
could be deployed in an operational area at the same cost per day or less as an HSV or 
LCS; therefore, ameliorating the disadvantage of being slowest to arrive at a scene of 
action. 
Conventional nation-to-nation conflicts are not the norm in warfare.  The U.S. has 
used military force over 300 times since the American Revolution, and that includes only 
eleven declared wars and some sustained conventional conflicts.  There have been 
roughly 30 major conflicts during the past decade, and only four actually occurred 
between nations (Jogerst, 2009).  History shows us that irregular warfare is a regular 
occurrence, and our Services are shifting to adapt to irregular challenges faced in this 
more common form of warfare.  Gompert and Gordon et al. (2008) found that the average 
length of an insurgency is more than a decade. If the U.S. is to deploy maritime forces in 
support of counterinsurgency or irregular operations then it is likely that assets deployed 
to support those forces will dwell for an extended period of time. Given the differentiated 
costs of the three vessels we studied as candidates to support MIW, it makes sense to send 
that vessel that provides the needed capability (as dictated by the tasks necessary to 
achieve a mission within a given region or MIW scenario), with the highest SOF utility, 
at the lowest possible cost.  Interestingly, the 10-year average duration for an insurgency 
coincides with the 10-year break-even point for a lease versus conversion for a vessel 
similar to the C-Champion or 14 years for a newly built vessel (ASN RDA, 2009).  
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Our nation’s leadership has identified the changing priorities in warfare.  In 2009, 
Defense Secretary Robert Gates stated that military force structure needs “to be 50 
percent focused on conventional warfare, 10 percent focused on irregular warfare and 40 
percent focused on dual-use capability for either conventional or irregular warfare” 
(O'Rourke, 2009).  The Services need to open more thorough lines of communication 
between the conventional military and the Special Operations communities in order to 
incorporate the strength of each community to offset the weaknesses in combating 
irregular challenges.  Furthermore, there has to be collaboration in identifying and 
acquiring the proper platforms to support combating these challenges. 
Though not the acquisition method typically preferred by the DoD, there are 
benefits to leasing/chartering vessels in support of MIW.  The advantages that 
leasing/chartering could provide are lower upfront costs if the cost of procurement is 
extended over the useful life of vessel and greater response and better value for 
taxpayers’ money especially for those assets and platforms that do not require an 
extensive acquisition process and can be purchased commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) or 
contracted through commercial companies. Leasing or chartering offers far more 
flexibility in highly dynamic operational environments since option years can be 
exercised at the discretion of the lessor.  The flexibility of exercising a future option 
allows the lessor to find the best vessel to meet current end-user requirements.  Whereas 
vessel procurement incurs a likely 30-year obligation to support, maintain and utilize a 
vessel and limits the capacity to adapt to changing end-user requirements. 
Under a different legislative context or regulatory climate, these options could 
once again be used.  In the near future, the defense budget’s anticipated growth in annual 
weapons investments may cause some politicians to become more open-minded to the 






Based on the analysis and recommendations presented in this project, decision-
makers in this arena have a mechanism from which to make a more informed decision 
regarding the acquisition of vessels supporting MIW.  The framework aligns specific 
vessels with their corresponding capabilities, on cost per day basis.  The cost-per-day 
comparison will aid commanders in determining the most appropriate vessel and cost-
effective acquisition method. 
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